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JURY NULLIFICATION: ASsEsSING RECENT
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
Jury nullification is a doctrine based on the concept that "ju-
rors have the inherent right to set aside the instructions of the
judge and to reach a verdict of acquittal based upon their own
consciences, and the defendant has the right to have the jury so
instructed."' Though jury nullification may seem like a shocking
proposal today, it is by no means a new idea.2 In fact, jury nullifi-
cation was first espoused nearly three and one half centuries ago.3
The development of jury nullification, however, has been erratic,
gaming more and then less attention in various political climates.
The most recent application of jury nullification in the United
States occurred during the politically troubled Vietnam era.4 The
most dramatic developments of jury nullification have occurred,
however, only since 1991. In 1991, seven states proposed legis-
lation or constitutional amendments requiring judges, when issuing
their instructions to juries, to inform jurors that they are the judges
1. Alan W. Scheflin, Jury Nulfication: The Right to Say No, 45 CAL. L. REV. 168,
168 (1972).
2. See infra notes 9-92 and accompanying text (discussing the history of jury nulli-
fication).
3. The concept of jury nullification arose in 1649 in the treason trial of John
Lilburne. See infra notes 9-23 and accompanying text (discussing the Lilbume trial).
4. See Irwin A. Horowitz, The Effect of Jury Nulfication Instruction on Verdicts and
Jury Functioning in Criminal Trials, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 25, 27 (1985, No. 1) ("The
[jury nullification] controversy flared anew during the turbulent 1960s and earlier 1970s
when the U.S. government began to prosecute antiwar activists on, generally, crimnal
conspiracy charges."); Irwin A. Horowitz and Thomas E. Willging, Changing Views of
Jury Power: The Nullification Debate, 1787 - 1988, 15 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 165, 171
(1991, No. 2) (noting that the nullification controversy remained dormant until the Viet-
nam War period); Alan Scheflin & Ion Van'Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a
Controversy, 43 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 51, 63 (1980, No. 4) ("For the first half of
this century the controversy over jury nullification remained largely dormant. It began
anew m the 1960s in criminal cases involving political controversies.").
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of both law and fact and have the right to ignore the law and vote
their conscience.5
This note will discuss the concept of jury nullification in light
of the legislative and constitutional proposals of the last few years,
rather than debate the doctrine of jury nullification.6 This note will
first discuss the history of jury nullification, describing its ascent
and demise and how it has once again emerged as a popular,
though controversial, concept. This note will then discuss the vari-
ous legislative proposals and constitutional amendments, focusing
on differences in both language and scope. This note will further
analyze the doctrine in terms of the benefits and drawbacks result-
ing from each of the various proposals, including why all of the
proposals have failed to be enacted. Finally, this note will propose
language for legislation or a constitutional amendment which will
encompass the benefits of the various proposals, but avoid the pit-
falls which have thus far resulted in their failure.
Regardless of one's personal opinion of the concept of jury
nullification, reality dictates that juries, in appropriate cases, are
likely to nullify the law whether they are given permission to or
not.7 It seems practical, then, in light of the widespread support
that jury nullification has recently obtained and the reality of how
juries behave, to draft legislation which will enable juries to fully
perform their functions while, simultaneously, keeping enough
restraints on them to avoid "anarchy" 8
5. This instruction would ordinarily be applicable only in crimnal trials and in civil
trials where the government is a party. There are, however, many exceptions and varia-
tions to the instruction as proposed in individual states. See infa notes 93-125 and ac-
companying text.
6. Although the purpose of tus note is not to debate the doctrine of jury nullifica-
tion, the author wishes to make clear that the concept of jury nullification which she
endorses in this note, by way of a proposal for future jury nullification legislation, is only
the power of jurors to determine whether a particular law. should be applied under the
circumstances of the case before them. This is how the concept of jury nullification has
emerged in recent years: as a mechanism by which jurors can do justice in a particular
situation by refusing to apply a certain law to the particular facts of the case before
them. See Gary J. Simson, Jury Nullification in the American System: A Skeptical VKew,
54 TFX. L. REV. 488, 507 (1976) (drawing a distinction between the modem justice-ori-
ented concept of jury nullification and the historical notion of the jury's right to decide
the law). The author is not, however, endorsing the historical view of jury nullification:
that jurors, as the conscience of the community, have the right to decide what the law is
or should be. Id.
7. Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 4, at 55 ("Even without such an instruction, in
a small but significant number of cases, juries return verdicts of 'not guilty' despite
strong evidence to the contrary because they feel the application of the law to the defen-
dant would lead to an unjust result.").
8. Benton L. Becker, Jury Nullification: Can a Jury Be Trusted?, TRIAL Oct. 1980 at
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I. THE TRADITION OF JURY NULLIFCATION
A. The English Tradition
In 1649, the notion that jurors ought to be regarded as the
judges of both law and fact was introduced by Lt. Col. John
Lilburne in his celebrated trial for treason.' Lilburne was prosecut-
ed for the publication of several pamphlets highly critical of the
English government under a series of newly enacted statutes mak-
ing even the expression of anti-government opinion treasonous.'
At trial, Lilburne argued that the jurors were the judges of law as
well as of fact. This novel argument did not arise from his contest-
ing the validity of the laws under which he was being prosecuted,
but arose from the Court's refusal to allow Lilburne.the assistance
of counsel." His request for counsel having been denied, Lilburne
asked the court if he might
speak in [his] own behalf unto the jury, [his] countrymen,
upon whose consciences, integrity and honesty, [his] life,
and the lives and liberties of the honest men of this nation,
now lie; who are in law judges of law as well as fact, and
you [the court] only the pronouncer of their sen-
tence 12
Historians have searched for the origin of and basis for Lilburne's
clain but have failed to uncover any material published prior to
Lilburne's 1649 trial referring to the jury's right to judge the
law 13 In fact, until Lilburne's focus on the law-finding role of
41 ("Opponents maintain that jury nullification defenses amount to an invitation to anar-
chy."). See also Scheflin, supra note 1, at 184 (stating that critics of nullification have
argued that jury discretion leads to a lawless society).
9. Philip B. Scott, Jury Nullification: An Historical Perspective on a Modern Debate,
91 W. VA. L. REV. 389, 397 (1989). IA. Col. John Lilbume was the leader of the "Lev-
ellers", a prormnent radical political segment arising during the English Civil War of the
1640s. THOMAS A. GREEN, VERDICt ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE 153-56 (1985). The
Levellers promoted the idea of umversal male suffrage and a localized court system which
would take power away from "the centralized bench at Westminster and the elitist legal
profession" Id.
10. Scott, supra note 9, at 398.
11. Id. at 398-99. See also Green, supra note 9, at 173 ("Had the court acceded to
Lilbume's extraordinary claim to counsel, he might never have made his claim to a jury
right, although he could have hoped to provoke a debate on the law between his own
counsel and the government's attorney, a debate which the jury nught then have resolved
by its verdict, with or without the approval of the bench.").
12. GREEN, supra note 9, at 173.
13. Scott, supra note 9, at 397.
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the criminal trial jury, the attention of the Levellers and other
reformers had been primarily focused on the formal attributes of
the jury, rather than its history and purpose. 4 It appears, however,
that Lilburne's concept of the "jury as judges of law" was not a
spur of the moment last ditch effort at a defense, but was implicit
in his work from 1646 onward. 5
In addition to the source of the "jury as judges of law" theory
being unclear, Lilburne's meaning regarding his view of jurors as
judges of both law and fact was also remarkably unclear. 6 In
1653, the full scope of Lilburne's "jury as judges of law" theory
became clear when Lilburne was once again put on trial for his
life. 7 In this second trial, Lilbume based his entire defense on
the notion that the act which banished him and prescribed Ins
death was unlawful.i" Historians describe Lilburne's defense m the
following manner:
Lilburne argued that the jury had the right and duty to
judge a statute or an indictment in the light of English
fundamental law and to acquit the defendant if, despite a
judicial charge to the contrary, the jury found that the
statute was void. Moreover, Lilburne now asserted that the
jury ought to acquit the defendant if it believed that the
prescribed punishment was unconscionably severe in light
of the acts proved to have been committed by the defen-
dant. The jury test the "legality" of the indictment and de-
cide the fairness of the prescribed punishment. 9
The jury took heed of Lilburne's claims and on August 20, 1653,
found him "not guilty of any crime worthy of death." 20
While Lilburne was the person responsible for igniting the
debate, the Quakers soon picked up on the "jury as judges of law"
14. GREEN, supra note 9, at 161-62.
15. See id. at 162 (Lilburne's early work claimed that the jury's role was to judge
cases; control over law as well as fact is an implicit assumption m flus role).
16. Id. at 159. Following Lilburne's utterance of tlus concept, another Leveller writer,
John Jones, attempted to give meaning to this phrase. He argued that full control over
issues of law should rest with the people, the jury. Scott, supra note 9, at 399 (citing
JOHN JONES, JUDGES JUDGED OUT Op THEiR OWN MoUTHs (London, May 6, 1650); JoHN
JONES, JURORS, JUDGES OF LAW AND FACT (London, Aug. 2, 1650)).
17. See Scott, supra note 9, at 401-02 (discussing Lilburne's second trial and the argu-
ments presented).
18. Id. at 401.
19. GREEN, supra note 9, at 159-60.
20. Scott, supra note 9, at 402.
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concept and carried the debate forward into the 1660's. 21 The
Quakers, persecuted by the Stuart monarchy for their religious
beliefs, argued to the juries before whom they were tried that the
Acts under which they were being prosecuted were being improper-
ly interpreted by the English courts. 22 By 1670 the issue of jury
control of the law was ripe for resolution.23
On August 14, 1670, William Penn and William Mead were
arrested for seditious preaching before an unlawful assembly 24
Penn argued at trial that the facts as alleged failed to prove that
any law was broken and, therefore, the indictment was illegal.2
The judge replied that the indictment was not based on a statute
but on the common law.26
After deliberations, only eight of the twelve jurors were ready
to convict.' 7 The jury was then threatened with imprisonment and
starvation if they continued to refuse to convict Penn and Mead.2
The jury returned what was essentially a special verdict, refusing to
speak to the heart of the indictment, finding Penn guilty of
speaking but not to an unlawful assembly and finding Mead not
guilty 29 After the judge sent the jury out once again, a simple
,not guilty verdict was returned for both defendants. 30 The jurors
were then fined 40 marks and imprisoned until it was paid.3'
Edward Bushel was one of the four Penn and Mead jurors who
stood by his conscience and refused to convict the defendants.3 2
21. Id.
22. Id. at 403 (stating that the Quakers did not challenge the validity of the Conventi-
cles Act itself, but only the interpretation that presumed seditious intent).
23. Id.
24. Scheflin, supra note 1, at 170. The unlawful assembly resulted after Penn and
Mead were locked out of their usual meeting place and forced instead to speak before a
large crowd gathered on the street. Scott, supra note 9, at 394.
25. See Scott, supra note 9, at 394 ("[The thrust of Penn and Mead's defense was
that the facts as alleged failed to prove that any law was broken.").
26. Id. The judge, after removing Penn and Mead from his courtroom, informed the
jury that the indictment was for "preaching and drawing a tumultuous company.-
Penn & Mead's Case (22 Charles H 1670), repnted in 6 I. HOWELL, COBBETT'S COM-
PLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 960 (Vol. VI 1810).
27. Scott, supra note 9, at 395.
28. Scheflin, supra note 1, at 170; Scott, supra note 9, at 395.
29. Scheflin, supra note 1, at 170-71.
30. Scott, supra note 9, at 395.
31. Id.
32. Id See also Scheflin, supra note 1, at 171-72 (stating that after the court had
ordered the jury to reconsider their verdict several times, Bushel, the foreman, objected to
any further deliberations arguing that the jurors had given their verdict and were all
agreed to it).
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Charges were then waged against Bushel that his verdict was "con-
tra plenum et manifestam evidentiam" and "contra directionam
cariae in materia legs" 33 The opinion in Bushel's Case, written
by Chief Justice Vaughn, is the basis of jury nullification
proponents' claim of a common law right to nullify the law '
The main premise of Vaughn's decision results from his disposition
of the first charge against Bushel, that his verdict was against the
full and manifest weight of the evidence. On this charge Vaughn
"held that a juror can be fined only if it is shown that the juror
returned a verdict contrary to his own view of the evidence, an act
of perjury " 35 In reaching this conclusion, Vaughn reasoned that
often two men, and even two judges, presented the same set of
facts will draw different conclusions, whether due to differing
backgrounds which gives one a different perspective on a case or
for any number of other reasons. 36 This rationale set the stage for
Vaughn's disposition of the second charge that the return of an
acquittal was against the direction of the court in matter of law 
37
Judge Vaughn argued that:
Without a fact agreed, it is impossible for a judge, or any
other, to know the law relating to that fact or directly con-
cemmg it, as to know an accident that hath no subject.
Hence it follows, that the judge in logic can never direct
what the law is in any matter controverted, without first
knowing the fact; and then it follows, that without his
previous knowledge of the fact, the jury cannot in logic go
against his direction in law for he could not direct yet
the jury find not (as in a special verdict) the fact of every
case by itself, leaving the law to the court, but find for the
plaintiff or defendant upon the issue to be tried, wherein
they resolve both law and fact complicatedly, and not the
fact by itself; so as though they answer not singly to the
33. Bushel's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (1670), repnnted in 6 . HOWELl., COBBETT'S
COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 999 (Vol. Vi 1810).
34. See Scheflin, supra note 1, at 172 (using language m Bushel's Case to support is
argument for the, historic right of juries to nullify the law); Scott, supra note 9, at 396-97
(stating that jury nullification proponents herald this case as supporting their cause);
Simson, supra note 6, at 493 ("For those anxious to prove the jury's lustoncal right to
reach an independent determination of the law, then, Bushel's Case is nothing less than a
paean to that purported right.").
35. Scott, supra note 9, at 396.
36. Id. at 395-96.
37. GREEN, supra note 9, at 241.
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question what is law, yet they determine the law in all
matters, where issue is joined 38
Jury nullification advocates contend that this language supports
the interpretation of this case holding that the jurors had the right
to set aside the judge's rendition of the law for one more consis-
tent, in their opinion, with the principles of fundamental law 39
Jury nullification advocates, however, are not the only ones who
hoped to profit from this opinion. Vaughn's words may also, and
indeed have been, interpreted as lending support to the idea that
judges control the law while jurors control the facts.'
An even more powerful blow to the proponents' position,-how-
ever, is delivered by the following statement by Vaughn m the
same decision: "That Decantum in our books, 'ad quaestionem facti
nonrespondent judices, ad quaestionam legis nonrespondent
juratores', literally taken is true: for if it be demanded, what is the
fact? the Judge cannot answer it; if it be asked, what is the law in
the case, the jury cannot answer it.'' 4' Thus, Vaughn's opinion
does not clearly and explicitly lend support to the jury's right to
judge the law. In reality, Vaughn managed to sidestep the whole
debate by concentrating on the jury's role as factfinder and how
fining jurors under such charges as those levied against Bushel
encroached on the jurors' ability to perform this function.4 2
38. Bushel's Case at 1010, 1015-17.
39. See Simson, supra note 6, at 492 (stating that nullification proponents contend that
the court's reason for granting Bushel's and his fellow jurors' writs of habeas corpus was
that "the jurors had been punished for doing what was traditionally their right: setting
aside the judge's rendition of the law for one more consistent, in the jury's estimation,
with the pnnciples of 'fundamental law' informing the development of the common
law.").
40. Scott, supra note 9, at 406 (arguing that Vaughn's opinion supports the absolute
power of juries to find the facts but does not address any legitimate law-finding role for
the jury); Simson, supra note 6, at 493 ("The case is far more amenable, however, to a
wholly different construction: that the abuse of judicial authority which the Court of Com-
mon Pleas took measures to correct was not the trial judge's denial of any right on the
jury's part to decide questions of law but rather his encroachment on the jury's undis-
puted right to decide questions of fact."). Opponents of jury nullification argue that
Vaughn did not intend that the right to apply the law, which he recognized as an mher-
ent function of crimnal juries, include the right to nullify the law. Scott, supra note 9, at
406. Instead, the crux of Vaughn's opinion is that the law of any given case is dependent
on its facts. Id. Since everyone draws different inferences from the same facts, and it is
the jury's role to determine just what the facts are, it is impossible for a judge to rule
that a given verdict is in contravention of the facts, or, consequently, of the law since
that law is dependent on the facts. Id.
41. Bushel's Case at 1013.
42. Scott, supra note 9, at 406-07.
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Following Vaughn's decision in Bushel's Case, English courts
conceded that a jury's determination of fact and the application of
the law to such fact was final and unreviewable m criminal cas-
es.4' This division of power worked well in the run of the mill
felony cases where even the judges were likely to feel the pumsh-
ments prescribed for such crimes were too harsh.44 Problems
arose, however, when the crime charged was of a more political
nature, particularly that of seditious libel.45
B. The American Tradition
The English law of seditious libel gave rise to the central case
in the American tradition of jury nullification: the trial of John
Peter Zenger.46 The trial of John Peter Zenger began on August
43. Id. at 408. See also Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 4, at 57 (stating that "The
broader right of the jury to pass on questions of law as well as issues of fact was quck-
ly accepted in England.").
44. Scott, supra note 9, at 408.
45. Id. Seditious libel is defined as a "communication written with the intent to incite
the people to change the government otherwise than by lawful means, or to advocate the
overthrow of the government by force or violence." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1357 (6th
ed. 1990).
In seditious libel cases, the courts developed a common law which infringed tremen-
dously on the role of the jury as it had been defined in Bushel's Case. Id. at 409 (stat-
ng that the reservations to the court as questions of law whether the words were in fact
libelous and whether the defendant had the necessary criminal intent made significant
inroads on the traditional role of the jury as defined in Bushel's Case); Jon M. Van
Dyke, The Jury as a Political Institution, 16 CATH. LAw. 224, 229-30 (Summer 1970)
(discussing seditious libel law in 18th century England).
The King's Bench announced that it would have sole jurisdiction over such political
cases and reserved unto itself as questions of law whether the words were in fact libelous
and whether the defendant had the necessary criminal intent. Id. In addition, the truth was
not considered a defense to charges of seditious libel. Id. As a result, the only questions
of fact left to the jury were the fact of publication and whether the publication referred
to the particular people or government body as charged. Id. The controversy was put to
rest in England in 1792 when an Act of Parliament returned these questions of fact to
the jury so that the role of the jury in seditious libel cases would be the same as it was
in every other criminal trial. Scott, supra note 9, at 416.
46. Zenger was a printer living in the colony of New York. Scott, supra note 9, at
410-11. In 1733, Zenger was solicited by James Alexander to print the New York Weekly
Journal, a paper founded expressly to oppose the governor of New York, William Cosby,
by various means from serious criticism to satire and to rally support for the new opposi-
tion party. Id. James Alexander was a prominent New York attorney representing popular
New York politicians Lewis Mors and Rip Van Dam, each of whom had an axe to
grind with the Governor Cosby. Id. at 410. See also Stanley N. Katz, Introduction to
JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER
ZENGER 3-5 (Stanley N. Katz ed. 1963) (discussing the conflicts between Cosby and
Lewis Van Dam). In January of 1734, after being in publication for only two months,
Governor Cosby determined that he was going to shut the paper down. Scott, supra note
JURY NULLIFICATION
4, 1735.47 Zenger's attorney, Hamilton, argued the law to the ju-
ry The premise of Hamilton's argument was that truth should be a
viable defense to a charge of seditious libel.4 ' Hamilton contended
that:
[Juries] have the right beyond all dispute to determine both
the law and the facts, and where they do not doubt of the
law, they ought to do so. This of leaving it to the judg-
ment of the Court whether the words are libelous or not m
effect renders juries useless (to say no worse) in many cas-
es.
49
The essence of Hamilton's defense, then, was that, in order for the
jury to fulfill their traditional role, they must nullify the law 50 In
a very short period of time the jury returned a verdict of not guilty
for John Peter Zenger.51
The impact of Zenger on the American colonies was dramatic.
Every jurisdiction which confronted the issue of the jury's right to
decide the law as well as the facts reached the same conclusion:
American juries had the right to decide the law.52 Although it is
difficult to say precisely why this tradition of jurors as finders of
law as well as fact emerged, three reasons can reasonably be as-
serted.
First, in colonial America the jury was a shield between the
people and an undemocratic, tyrannical government. 3 The jury
9, at 411-12. For an entire year Cosby was unable to get a grand jury to return an in-
dictment against Zenger for seditious libel. Id. During this period, however, Cosby had,
despite the lack of an indictment, burned issues of the Weekly Journal, which Alexander
continued to print himself, and ordered Zenger jailed. Id. In January of 1735, an informa-
tion finally had to be resorted to in order to bring Zenger to trial. Id. at 412. After dis-
barring Zenger's attorneys, Alexander and Smith, the presiding judge, Chief Justice
DeLancey, who had himself been appointed by Cosby, appointed another New York attor-
ney loyal to the Governor, John Chambers, to represent Zenger. Id Katz, supra, at 19-21.
Morrs and Van Dam, however, doubting Chambers' impartiality, retained Alexander Ham-
ilton to represent Zenger. Scott, supra note 9, at 413; Katz, supra, at 21. The fact that
Hamilton would be defending Zenger was not divulged to the Attorney General or the
Cluef Justice. Id.
47. Scott, supra note 9, at 413.
48. Katz, supra note 42, at 23.
49. Scott, supra note 9, at 414.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 415.
52. Mark D. Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582 (1939);
Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L. I. 170
(1964).
53. Scott, supra note 9, at 417; Note, supra note 52, at 171.
11091993]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
provided the only significant means of democratic expression avail-
able to the people at this time.-4 Second, the political philosophy
m the last days of colonial rule and the first as an independent
nation demanded popular control over every facet of govern-
ment.
55
The colonists had a basic distrust of legal experts and a
profound belief in the ability of the common man. Natural
rights and the natural law were the maxims of the day, and
one of the basic tenets of Lockean theory is that the natu-
xal law, principles of right and wrong, is equally accessible
to every man. Consequently, each juror was just as quali-
fied as each judge to determine the true law 56
The primary reason, however, fof the acceptance of the "jury
as judges of law" concept was pragmatism." During this period
in American history, the judge truly knew no more than the jurors,
the judiciary being largely comprised of laymen.5"
These reasons for accepting and even promoting the jury's
right to decide questions of law, however, waned as the nation
grew and the republican form of government was activated.59 The
will of the people was now expressed through popular elections
and legislation.' Thus, nullifying the law would be a frustration
of the popular will.61 Additionally, judges were more likely to
receive formal training.6 2 The transformation of the role of the
jury, which occurred as the United States matured, was summarized
in the case of United States v. Dougherty:63
As the distrust of judges appointed and removable by the
king receded, there came increasing acceptance that under a
republic the protection of citizens lay not in recognizing
54. Scott, supra note 9, at 416.
55. Id. at 417.
56. Note, supra note 52, at 172.
57. Scott, supra note 9, at 417.
58. Id. (arguing that it was only natural for the jury to assert itself on legal issues
when the judges, who were largely laymen, knew no more than the jurors did); Simnson,
supra note 6, at 503 (arguing that since the colonial judges were typically laymen and,
therefore, had no greater claim to know the law than the jurors, the colonial judges readi-
ly ceded to the jury the authority to decide the law).
59. Scott, supra note 9, at 417-18.
60. id.
61. Id. at 418.
62. Id.
63. 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
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the right of each jury to make its own law, but in follow-
ing democratic processes for changing the law '
The widespread acceptance of jury nullification in America,
then, was gradually replaced with the realization that such a right
was no longer necessary or desirable in a democratic society 65
Thus, judges began to assert that the jury was to decide questions
of fact while the judge would decide questions of law In 1895, in
the case of Sparf and Hansen v. United States,' the Supreme
Court determined once and for all that, in the federal system at
least, there would be no right to jury nullification.
[Juries] have the physical power to disregard the law, as
laid down to them by the court. But, I deny that they
have the moral right to decide the law according to their
own notions or pleasure. On the contrary, I hold it the
most sacred constitutional right of every party accused of a
crime that the jury should respond as to the facts, and the
court as to the law This is the right of every citizen,
and it is his only protection.67
Following the Supreme Court's announcement in Sparf and
Hansen that there would be no right to jury nullification in the
federal court system, the controversy appeared to fizzle out. The
debate was rekindled, however, in the midst of the political contro-
versies of the 1960s.68 "As the Department of Justice moved dra-
matically against antiwar activists, defense lawyers sought a legal
means to allow the jurors, as the conscience of the community, to
consider the morality of the defendant's actions."69
64. Id. at 1132.
65. "Public and private safety alike would be in peril, if the principle be established
that juries in criminal cases may, of right, disregard the law as expounded to them by the
court and become a law unto themselves T]he result would be that the enforce-
ment of law against criminals and the protection of citizens against unjust and groundless
prosecutions, would depend entirely upon juries uncontrolled by any settled, fixed, legal
principles." Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 101-02 (1895).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 74.
68. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
69. Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 4, at 63. Some examples of the politically sensi-
tive cases in which the jury nullification issue was raised are: United States v. Dougherty,
473 F.2d 1113, 1130-37 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding that the refusal of the district court to
instruct the jury of its right to acquit defendants without regard to the law and the evi-
dence was not improper); United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 180-81 (1st Cir. 1969)
(holding that the issuing of special interrogatories, designed to destroy the jury's power to
nullify the law, to a criminal trial jury constitutes reversible error because it infringes on
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United States v. Dougherty7 is one of the better known, more
recent cases involving a jury nullification debate. In this case the
defendants, known as the D.C. Nine, all members of the Catholic
clergy, ransacked the offices of Dow Chemical to protest the man-
ufacturing of napalm by the company 7 The defendants requested
that the jury be told specifically of their power to nullify the
law 72 The trial court refused and the Court of appeals, by a 2-1
vote, upheld the trial court's decision.73 In upholding the trial
court's decision, Judge Leventhal, writing for the majority, indi-
cated that, in his opinion, jurors already knew of their power to
nullify the law 74 To institutionalize these powers in judicial in-
structions to the jury, he concluded, would alter the system in
unpredictable ways."5 Thus, Judge Leventhal essentially recognized
the power of juries to nullify the law but not their right to do so.
In dissent, Judge Bazelon criticized the opinion as impinging the
jury's right to exercise its conscience in reaching a verdict: "Nul-
lification is not a 'defense' recognized by law, but rather a mecha-
nism that permits a jury, as community conscience, to disregard the
strict requirements of law where it finds that those requirements
cannot justly be applied in a particular case."7 6
The decision in another Vietnam era case, United States v.
Spock"77 is very similar. In this case, the trial court had attempted
to eliminate the possibility of the jury nullifying the law by utiliz-
ing a verdict based on special interrogatories. 8 This procedure
was appealed to the First Circuit, where the decision of the trial
court permitting the use of special interrogatories was overturned
because it restricted the criminal jury's historic right to render a
verdict free from judicial control.79 By restricting the holding to
this narrow ground, the court avoided a controversial ruling that
such special interrogatories were invalid because they prevented the
the jury's power to deliberate free from judicial pressure on its verdict).
70. 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. 1972).
71. Id. at 1121.
72. Id. (stating that the district court denied defendant's request for a nullification in-
struction).
73. Id. at 1130-37 (discussing the issue of jury nullification).
74. Id. at 1135 ("The jury knows well enough that its prerogative is not limited to the
choices articulated in the formial instructions of the court.").
75. Id. at 1135.
76. Id. at 1140.
77. 416 F.2d 165 (ist Cir. 1969).
78. Id. at 180.
79. Id. at 181-83.
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possibility of jury nullification.80
This is the pattern established by "conscience cases" in recent
decades. Without holding that juries have the right to nullify the
law, which the Supreme Court decided against almost 100 years
ago,"1 the recent appellate courts have recogmzed and may even
be said to have preserved the power of the jury to nullify the law
in appropriate cases.' Whether juries have the right to nullify the
law has not been considered by the Supreme Court since 1895,
when this concept was rejected. 3 Although many people believe
it is time to reconsider this decision, there is no indication from
the Court that this will occur anytime soon.
Proponents and opponents of jury nullification view the reemer-
gence of the nullification debate very differently Opponents of jury
nullification contend that "[tioday, nullification is urged not so that
a jury can refuse to apply an oppressive law, but so that it can
adopt the defendant's view of policy or morality "84 Thus; jury
nullification opponents contend that the movement for jury nullifi-
cation in colonial times was essentially an effort by a continually
oppressed society to enact a democratic form of government. In
contrast, today's jury nullification movement is an effort by grass
roots organizations, unsuccessful in having their policies promoted
and endorsed by Congress or their state legislatures, to sneak their
political agendas in the back door by making the jury the new
determinant of public policy 85 "Jury nullification's real purpose in
80. See Becker, supra note 8, at 44 (argumng that the court's narrow holding weakens
the authority for a jury nullification instruction).
81. Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
82. Other federal cases have recognized the jury's power to nullify the law but not the
right. See United States v. Burkhart, 501 F.2d 993 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
946 (1975) (allowing defense counsel some leeway in persuading the jury to acquit out of
considerations of mercy or obedience to a higher law despite initially ruling that there is
no right to a jury nullification instruction); United States v. Boardman, 419 F.2d 110 (1st
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991 (1970) ("Today jurors may have the power to
ignore the law, but their duty is to apply the law as interpreted by the court, and they
should be so instructed.").
83. See Sparf and Hansen, 156 U.S. 51 (holding that trial judges have the right and
duty to determune the law while the jurors determine the facts).
84. Scott, supra note 9, at 420. Tins view should be distingnished from the concept of
jury nullification as used in the trials of Lilbume, Penn and Zenger. In these cases the
laws under which the defendants were prosecuted were unconscionable and oppressive to
the defendants' rights. Id. In modem cases, such as Dougherzy, however, the concept of
jury nullification was pursued as a mechanism by which the jury could acquit the defen-
dants simply because it would be unjust to convict them, not because the laws under
which they were tried were m any respect unconscionable or oppressive. Id.
85. Id. at 419-23.
11131993]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
the current debate is to augment, or frustrate, the other avenues of
democratic participation established by our government; in other
words, to transform criminal prosecutions into vehicles for political
change.9
8 6
Proponents of jury nullification, on the other hand, argue that
jury nullification is as relevant today as it was 200 years ago.87
According to this faction, the purpose of nullification is to promote
justice by telling the jurors "that they have the power to act merci-
fully if they decide that applying the law to the defendant's act
would lead to an unjust result." 8 Jury nullification today, then,
although not necessary to protect individuals against government
oppression, remains a useful tool for the sentiment of the commu-
nity to be reflected in jury verdicts. Thus, proponents contend, the
jury and its ability to nullify the law insures that the spirit of the
law and not the letter of the law governs; that the rigidity of any
general rule can be shaped to produce justice in a particular case;
and, that common sense and community standards are reflected in
jury verdicts. 9
This, then, is the crux of the jury nullification debate today-
whether the jury, in light of its historical function and its proven
abilities, should be able to impact public policy by its power to
acquit defendants where it feels a conviction may violate public
morality 0 The issue has been debated numerous times in the last
twenty years and the arguments on both sides are substantial.91 In
86. Id. at 420.
87. See, e.g., Scheflin, supra note 1 (arguing that jurors are empowered to nullify the
law in modem society).
88. Van Dyke, supra note 41, at 225.
89. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANs ZEisEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 8-9 (1966) (dis-
cussing arguments in favor of and in opposition to jury trials); Scheflin, supra note 1, at
186 (discussing the function of the jury as the conscience of the community).
90. See Scheflin, supra note 1, at 181-89 (discussing the modem concept of jury nul-
lification); Scott, supra note 9, at 419-23 (discussing the role of the jury as policy-mak-
ers); Van Dyke, supra note 41, at 231-33 (discussing deficiencies of juries in general).
91. Since tis topic has been thoroughly debated in scholarly journals this note will
not attempt to exarmne all the various theones for supporting or opposing jury nullifica-
tion. See Becker, supra note 8, at 41 (arguing in favor of jury nullification as a process
whereby a jury elects to suspend the law in order to achieve what the law intended,
insuring that justice is done); M.D.A. Freeman, Why Not a Jury Nullification Statute Here
Too?, NEW L. J. 304-06 (March 19, 1981) (arguing that a jury nullification statute is
istoncally supported and will enable people to see the function of the jury more clearly);
Scheflin, supra note 1, at 169 (advocating that the jury has the right to be told by the
judge that they may refuse to apply the law to the defendant if in good conscience they
believe that the defendant should be acquitted); Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 4, at
55 (arguing that issuing a jury nullification instruction allows the jury to operate in a
1114 [VCol. 43:11I01
1993] JURY NULLIFICATION 1115
1991, however, a major development in the debate on jury nullifi-
cation occurred: legislation was introduced in a number of states
proposing statutes or constitutional amendments which, in varying
language, would require judges to inform jurors of their right to
nullify the law.'
II. JURY NULLIFICATION LEGISLATION: CURRENT PROPOSALS
Nineteen-ninety and 1991 may come to be regarded as the high
point in the modem debate on jury nullification. During this time
legislation or constitutional amendments which would require judg-
es to instruct jurors of their right to ignore the law and vote their
consciences were introduced in seven states.93 Several other states
anticipate the introduction of similar legislation in coming legisla-
tive sessions.'
Washington State Senate Bill 5356 was read for the first time
before the Washington State Senate on January 29, 1991. 95 The
more honest and just fashion and that failing to issue such an instruction seriously weak-
ens the concept of the jury, thereby impermissibly diluting the defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment rights); Scott, supra note 9, at 419 (arguing that history does not support the theory
that the right to nullify the law existed at common law); Simson, supra note 6, at 490
(arguing that the right of juries to nullify the law is not supported by history and, addi-
tionally, that the concept may be unconstitutional); Eleanor Tarns, The Law of an Unwnt-
ten Law: A Common Sense View of Jury Nullification, 11 W. ST. U. L. REV. 97, 114
(1983) (opposing the jury nullification instruction); Van Dyke, supra note 45, at 225 (ar-
guing that justice would be better served if jurors were told that they have the power to
act mercifully if they decide that applying the law to the defendant's act would lead to
an unjust result).
92. Credit for these proposals must be given to FIJA - The Fully Informed Jury
Association - a lobby organization which, in the first 18 months following its inception,
made considerable strides toward its goal of having jurors informed of their right to ig-
nore the law and vote their conscience.
93. See FIJA News From the States, THE FIjACTImsT, Number 8 (Summer 1991), at
3-7, 20-23 (describing FIJA developments among the various states).
94. Id. (describing the progress of movements to get jury rights legislation enacted m
various states).
95. S. 5356, 52nd Leg., 1991 Wash. Reg. Sess. Senate Bill 5356 would add new sec-
tions to chapters 10.04 and 10.46 of the Revised Code of Washington as follows:
(1) It is the natural right of every citizen of this state, when serving on a
criminal trial jury, to judge both the law and the facts pertaining to the case
before that jury, in order to determine whether justice will be serviced by ap-
plying the law to the defendant. It is mandatory that all jurors be informed of
this right.
(2) Before the jury hears a case, and again before jury deliberation begins,
the court shall inform the jurors of their rights in these words: "As jurors, your
first responsibility is to decide whether the defendant has broken the law. If
you decide that he has, but that you cannot in good conscience support a
guilty verdict, you are not required to do so. To reach a verdict that you be-
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proposed legislation suggests that juries should be instructed to
judge the law and the facts in order to determine if justice will be
served by applying the law to the defendant.' This reflects a sig-
nificant departure from Washington's current jury instruction.'
Presently, the pattern jury instructions to be issued in criminal jury
trials inform the jury that it is their duty to determine the facts in
the case from the evidence produced in court.98 Jurors are then
advised that they must accept the law from the court, regardless of
their personal beliefs as to what the law is, or ought to be." The
jury is instructed to apply the law to the facts and in that way
decide the case."° Senate Bill 5356 failed on March 6, 1991 in
the Committee on Law and Justice. 0 1
H.C.R. 2015 was introduced in the Arizona House of Represen-
tatives on February 13, 199 1.22 H.C.R. 2015 would require the
lieve is just, each of you has the right to consider to what extent the
defendant's actions have actually caused harm or otherwise violated your sense
of right and wrong. If 'you believe justice requires it, you may also judge both
the merits of the law under which he has been charged and the wisdom of
applying that law to the defendant. Accordingly, for each charge against the
defendant, even if review of the evidence strictly in terms of the law would
indicate a guilty verdict, you have the right to find him innocent The court
cautions that with the exercise of this right comes full moral responsibility for
the verdict you bring in."
(3) As part of their oath, the jurors shall affirm that they understand the
information concerning their rights which flus section requires the court to give
them, and no party to the trial may be prevented from encouraging jurors to
exercise this right. For the jurors to be so informed is declared to be part of
the defendant's fundamental right to trial by jury, and failure to conduct any
criminal trial m accordance with this section does not constitute harmless error,
and is grounds for mstrial. No potential juror may be disqualified from serving
on a jury because he expresses willingness to judge the law or its application,
or to vote according to conscience.
Id.
96. Id.
97. Wash. Pattern Instr. Crim. 1.02. See also Senate Comm. on Law & Justice, Senate
Bill 5356 Report to 52nd Leg. (Feb. 15, 1991).
98. Wash. Pattern Instr. Cnm. 1.02. See also Senate Comm. on Law & Justice, Senate
Bill 5356 Report to 52nd Leg. (Feb. 15, 1991).
99. Wash. Pattern Instr. Cnm. 1.02. See also Senate Comm. on Law & Justice, Senate
Bill 5356 Report to 52nd Leg. (Feb. 15, 1991).
100. Wash. Pattern Instr. Crim. 1.02. See also Senate Comm. on Law & Justice, Senate
Bill 5356 Report to 52nd Leg. (Feb. 15, 1991).
101. See infra notes 133-39 (discussing the reasons why this bill was not enacted).
102. H.C.R. 2015, 40th Leg., 1991 Ariz. 1st Reg. Sess. proposed an amendment to Ar-
ticle Vi, Section 27 of the Arizona State Constitution, relating to the authority of the jury
to determine the law. The language of the proposed amendment is as follows:
Section 27. Determination of law by juries; charge to all juries, reversal of
causes for technical error; affirmation of understanding.
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judge, m any jury trial in which Arizona or one of its political
subdivisions is a party, to inform the jurors that in addition to their
responsibility to judge the facts of the case they have an inherent
right to judge the law.103 H.C.R. 2015 passed the House Judiciary
Committee on March 12, 1991, unamended. This bill failed, how-
ever, in the House Rules Committee and was not presented to the
Senate. 104
A jury rights bill, New York Senate Bill 1085, was introduced
before the New York State Senate on January 22, 1991.05 The
B. NOTWITHSTANDING ANY LAW TO THE CONTRARY, IN
ANY JURY TRIAL IN WHICH THE STATE OR ONE OF ITS PO-
LITICAL SUBDIVISIONS IS A PARTY THE JUDGE SHALL INFORM
THE JURORS THAT IN ADDITION TO THEIR RESPONSIBILITY TO
JUDGE THE FACTS OF THE CASE, THEY HAVE AN INHERENT
RIGHT TO JUDGE THE LAW.
Id.
103. Comm. on Judiciary, H.C.R. 2015 Bill Summary, 40th Leg., 1st Reg. Session (Feb.
27, 1991). This amendment would reflect a significant departure from the present law in
Arizona which requires that judges not charge the juries with respect to matters of fact
but that they do tell the jurors what the applicable law is. ARIZ. CoNST. art. VI, § 27.
104. Letter from Louise Pyper, Administrative Assistant to the Chief Clerk, State of
Arizona House of Representatives, to M. Kristine Creagan, Notes Editor, Case Western
Reserve Law Review (Oct. 9, 1991) (on file with Case Western Reserve Law Review); see
infra notes 149-53 and accompanying text (discussing the documented objections to this
proposal).
105. S. 1085, 215 Leg., 1991-1992 N.Y. Reg. Sess. Senate Bill 1085 proposes to amend
§ 300.10 of New York's Criminal Procedure Law to read as follows:
In its charge, the court must state the fundamental legal principles applicable to
criminal cases in general. Such principles include, but are not limited to, the
presumption of the defendant's innocence, the requirement that guilt be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt and that the jury may not, in determining the issue
of guilt or innocence, consider or speculate concerning matters relating to sen-
tence or. punishment. Upon request of a defendant who did not testify in his
own behalf, but not otherwise, the court must state that the fact that he did not
testify is not a factor from which any inference unfavorable to the defendant
may be drawn. The court must also state the material legal pnnciples applicable
to the particular case, and, so far as practicable, explain the application of the
law to the facts, but it need not marshal or refer to the evidence to any great-
er extent than is necessary for such explanation. Upon request of a defendant,
the court must also state that the jury has the final authority to decide whether
or not to apply the law to the facts before it, that it is appropriate to bring
into its deliberations the feelings of the community and its own feelings based
on conscience, and that notlung would bar the jury from acquitting the defen-
dant if it feels that the law, as applied to the facts, would produce an mequi-
table or unjust result.
Id.
Currently, the law of New York declares that the court will state the fundamental
legal principles applicable to the particular case and, as far as is practicable will explain
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proposed legislation would require the judge to inform the jurors of
their right to vote their consciences if the defendant requests such
an instruction."° As of the fall of 1991, no hearings had been
held on Senate Bill 1085 and the bill was still pending."°
Massachusetts is another state in which jury rights legislation
has been introduced." 8 On January 2, 1991, Massachusetts Senate
Bill 656 was introduced. This bill eventually died in the Senate
Rules Committee and was reintroduced as Massachusetts Senate
Bill 1406209 Both bills require that jury handbooks inform jurors
of their obligation, right, and duty to judge according to their con-
sciences in all cases." Massachusetts Senate Bill 656 died in
committee in May of 1991.111 As of October of 1991, Massachu-
the application of that law to the facts. See N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAW § 300.10 (Consol.
1992).
106. S. 1085, 215 Leg., 1991-1992 N.Y. Reg. Sess.
107. Telephone Interview with clerk from office of Frank P. Romeo, Superintendent of
Documents, N.Y. State Senate (Oct. 8, 1991).
108. S. 656, 176 Leg., 1991 Mass. Reg. Sess., S. 1406, 176 Leg., 1991 Mass. Reg.
Seas.
109. Telephone Interview with clerk of Senate Judiciary Committee, Massachusetts State
Senate (Oct. 8, 1991). The language of these bills is as follows:
Section 1. Inform jurors the nature and extent of their duties and responsibili-
ties. The handbook for jurors shall inform jurors m all cases they have the
histoncal, constitutional and natural right to judge not only liability, guilt or
innocence of the defendant(s) under the law as charged but must also exercise
their conscience m doing so and that if they determine in their conscience that
the law as charged by the judge is unjust or wrongly applied to defendant(s).
Jurors have the obligation, right and duty to judge according to their con-
science.
Section 2. Educational materials and instructions shall inform grand jurors they
have the lustoncal, constitutional and natural right to judge not only the guilt
or innocence of defendant(s), under the law as charged but must also exercise
their conscience in doing so if they determine according to their conscience the
law as charged m the indictment is unjust or wrongly applied to defendant(s) it
is their obligation, right and duty not to retain an indictment according to their
conscience.
Section 3. The orientation of jurors shall include informing the grand and trial
jurors of their historical, constitutional and material right to judge not only
liability, guilt or innocence of the defendant(s) but must also exercise their con-
science that the law as charged is unjust or wrongly applied to defendant(s) it
is their obligation, right and duty to judge according to their conscience or not
to find a time bill as the case may be.
S. 656, 176 Leg., 1991 Mass. Reg. Sess., S. 1406, 176 Leg., 1991 Mass. Reg. Sess.
110. This proposal would be an addition to Chapter 234A of the Massachusetts General
Law, which currently does not require such information to be provided. See MASS. GEN.
L. ch. 234A (1991).
111. See infra note 156 and accompanying text (discussing documented objections to
this proposal).
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setts Senate Bill 1406 had been referred to the Senate Ways and
Means Committee." 2 According to a spokesperson for the Senate
Judiciary Committee, this bill also was recently killed in commit-
tee.
113
A fifth state in which jury nullification legislation has been
introduced is Louisiana.'1 4 Louisiana House Bill 1682 would cre-
ate a significant change in Louisiana law. At present, Louisiana
law states that m criminal matters tried by jury, the court must
charge the jury (1) as to the law applicable to the case; (2) that
the jury is the judge of the law and of the facts on the question of
guilt or innocence, but that it has the duty to accept and apply the
law as given it by the court; and (3) that the jury alone shall de-
termine the weight and credibility of the evidence.11 As pro-
posed, Louisiana House Bill 1682 would require the judge to
charge the jury that it may judge the merits of the law and the
merits of its applicability to the defendant, or it may accept and
apply the law as given by the court.1 6 H.B. 1682 died m the
House Committee on Criminal Justice without a hearing."7
Tennessee House Bill 430, an act relating to informed juries,
was filed for introduction on January 31, 1991.11 This bill pro-
112. S. 656 and S. 1406 Bill Summary, 176 Leg., 1991 Mass. Reg. Sess. (1991).
113. Telephone interview with Clerk of Senate Judiciary Committee, Massachusetts State
Senate (Oct 8, 1991).
114. H.B. 1682, 1991 La. Reg. Sess. Louisiana House Bill 1682, which was introduced
in the Regular Session of the Louisiana House of Representatives in 1991, stated as its
purpose:
To amend and reenact Code of Crunal Procedure Art. 802, relative to jury
charges; to require the trial judge to inform the jury of their right to judge the
merits and applicability of the law, and to provide for related matters. Be it
enacted by the Legislature of Louisiana: Section 1. Code of Criminal Procedure
Art. 802 is hereby amended and reenacted to read as follows:
ART. 802. General charge; scope. The court shall charge the jury:
(1) as to the law applicable to the case;
(2) That the jury is the judge of the law and of the facts on the
question of guilt or innocence, that it may accept and apply the law as
given by the court or it may judge the merits and application of the
law; and
(3) That the jury alone shall determine the weight and credibility
of the evidence.
Id.
115. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 802 (West 1991).
116. H.B. 1682, 1991 La. Reg. Sess.
117. Telephone interview with Clerk from Legislative Services, Louisiana House of
Representatives (Oct. 8, 1991).
118. H.B. 430, 97th General Assembly, 1991 Tenn. Reg. Sess. The bill reads as fol-
lows:
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poses that jurors be informed of their right to nullify the law m all
criminal cases and in civil trials m which the government or any
of its agencies is a party 119 Tennessee House Bill 430 and its
companion bill, Senate Bill 1186, both passed several consider-
ations and were referred to the respective Judiciary Commit-
tees.12o These bills died in the Tennessee Rules Committee.12 1
Finally, jury rights legislation has also been introduced in Tex-
BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF
TENNESSEE:
SECTION 1. The title of this act is and may be cited as "The Fully Informed
Jury Act"
SECTION 2. Tennessee Code Annotated, Title 22, is amended by adding Sec-
tion 3 as a new, appropriately designated section;
SECTION 3.
(a) In any cruinal trial, the court must inform the jury of its right to judge
both law and facts m reaching a verdict. The court must also inform civil trial
jurors of their right to judge the law as well as the facts whenever the govern-
ment or any agent of the government is a party to the trial.
Trial jurors must acknowledge by oath that they understand this right,
and no party to the trial may be prevented from encouraging them to exercise
it. No potential juror may be disqualified from serving on a jury because he
expresses a willingness to judge the law or its application, or to vote according
to conscience.
Failure to inform the jury, or any other infraction of these rules of
procedure, is grounds for nstrial and another trial by jury.
(b) Before the jury hears a crimnal case, and again before jury deliberation
begins, the court shall inform the jurors of their rights in these words:
As jurors, your first responsibility is to decide whether the defendant has
broken the law. If you decide that he has, but that you cannot in good
conscience support a guilty verdict, you are not required to do so. To
reach a verdict which you believe is just, each of you has the right to
consider to what extent the defendant's actions have actually caused
harm or otherwise violated your sense of right and wrong. If you be-
lieve justice requires it, you may also judge both the merits of the law
under which he has been charged and the wisdom of applying that law
to the defendant. Accordingly, for each charge against the defendant,
even if review of the evidence strictly in terms of the law would indi-
cate a guilty verdict, you have the right to find him innocent. The court
cautions that with the exercise of this right comes full moral responsibil-
ity for the verdict you bring in.
Id.
119. Id. This proposal would amend Title 22 of the Tennessee Code Annotated which
does not currently provide for any required instructions to jurors. TENN. CODE ANN. § 22
(1991).
120. See H. Journal, 97th General Assembly State of Tennessee, (Jan. 28-31 and Feb. 4-
7, 1991); S. Journal, 97th General Assembly State of Tennessee, (Jan. 28-31, 1991).
121. Telephone Interview with Ann Alley, Tennessee State Library and Archives
(Oct. 24, 1991). See infra notes 157-62 and accompanying text (discussing the apparent
reasons why this proposal was not enacted).
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as. Texas House Bill 25 was introduced before the House Com-
mittee on Criminal Jurisprudence in the Regular Session of the
72nd Legislature." It was intended to apply in both civil and
criminal trials. This bill would empower junes to nullify the law as
applied to the particular defendant before them, thus finding him
not liable if the jury determined that a law was unjust or wrongly
applied to the defendant." A public hearing was held on Texas
122. H.B. 25, 72nd Leg., 1991 Tex. Reg. Sess. The bill was proposed as follows:
BE iT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS:
SECTION 1. Chapter 62, Government Code, is amended by adding
Subchapter G to read as follows:
SUBCHAPTER G; JURY NULLIFICATION
Sec. 62.601. POWER TO NULLIFY. If a jury determines that a
party is liable according to the law and that the law is unjust or wrong-
ly applied to the party, the jury may nullify the applicable law as ap-
plied to the party and find the party not liable.
Sec. 62.602. JURY INSTRUCTION. Before jury deliberation, the
court shall instruct the jury as follows: -If you determine that a party is
liable according to the law, before reaching a verdict you may consider
the motives of the party. If you find the law to be unjust or wrongly
applied to the party, you may vote according to conscience and find the
party not liable, regardless of the facts of the case.-
Sec. 62.603. DISQUALIFICATION PROHIBITED. A potential
juror may not be excused or disqualified from serving on a jury because
the juror expresses a willingness to nullify law.
Sec. 62.604. CONFLICT WITH TEXAS RULES OF CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE.
(a) To the extent that this subchapter conflicts with the Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure, this subchapter controls.
(b) Notwithstanding Section 22.004, the supreme court may not
amend or adopt rules in conflict with tlus subchapter.
SECTION 2. Article 36.13, Code of Criminal Procedure, is amended to read as
follows:
Art 36.13. JURY IS JUDGE OF FACTS AND LAW.
(a) Unless otherwise provided in this Code, the jury is the exclusive
judge of the facts. The jury is bound to receive the law from the court
and be governed thereby, except if a jury determines that a defendant is
guilty according to the law and that the law is unjust or wrongly ap-
plied to the defendant, the jury may nullify the applicable law as ap-
plied to the defendant and find the defendant not guilty.
(b) Before jury deliberation, the judge shall instruct the jury as fol-
lows: "If you determine that the defendant is guilty according to the
law, before reaching a verdict you may consider the motives of the
defendant. If you find the law to be unjust or wrongly applied to the
defendant, you may vote according to conscience and find the defendant
not guilty, regardless of the facts of the case."
(c) A potential juror may not be excused or disqualified from serving
on a jury because the juror expresses a willingness to nullify law.
Id.
123. Id. This proposal creates a significant change in the current law of Texas, which
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House Bill 25 on February 12, 1991, before the Committee on
Criminal Jurisprudence. The Committee voted not to pass the bill
at this hearing. 24
As is apparent from these proposed statutes, the jury rights
proposals have varied significantly from one state to another and
from the law as it presently stands in each of these states. Thus
far, none of these proposals has been enacted into law but it is




A. State Legislative Proceedings
Of the seven states where legislation was introduced last year,
only two of these states, Washington and Texas, held formal public
hearings which were taped or transcribed and, therefore, available
for reference.
1. Washington Legislative Hearings
The hearings in Washington consisted primarily of people
speaking in support of the jury rights legislation. 126 The major
themes which emerged from this testimony were that juries do in
fact have the right to nullify the law, that a nullification instruction
would promote justice as opposed to simple lawfulness, and that a
nullification instruction would enhance the separation of pow-
ers. 
127
a. Arguments in Favor of the Washington Proposal
The first argument in support of the Washington proposal was
raised by Richard Shepard, Esq., the chairman of the Coalition for
states that the jurors are the exclusive judges of the facts but that they are bound to
receive and be governed by the law as pronounced by the court. TE. CODE CRIM. PROC.
CODE ANN. art. 36.13 (West 1991).
124. Jury Nullification, Hearings on H.B. 25 before the Tex H. Comm. on Crm. Juris-
prudence, 72nd Leg., 1991 Tex. Reg. Ses. (Feb. 12, 1991) (on tape). See infra notes
141-50 and accompanying text (discussing the heanngs which were held regarding this bill
and why it was not enacted).
125. FIJA News From the States, THE FIJACTIVST, Number 8 (Summer 1991), at 3-7,
20-23 (describing the progress each state has made in enacting jury rights legislation).
126. Jurors Right to Just Verdict: Hearings on S. 5356 Before the Law and Justice





a Fully Informed Jury Amendment, who testified that the right to
jury nullification was established in the Magna Carta and is firmly
established m our common law tradition. ss Secondly, Mr.
Shepard argued that whether we recognize and inform jurors of
their right to nullify the law depends on the view we adopt with
respect to the purpose of the justice system."9 In other words,
the issue is one of justice versus lawfulness.' Mr. Shepard and
DeAnn Pratt-Pullar, a representative of the Libertarian Party, both
argued that the goal of the criminal justice system in Washington
State, and presumably in the United States, is to promote jus-
tice.13' In order to accomplish justice, conformity with the spirit
of the law - not the letter of the law - is critical. The proposed
jury instruction would stress this concept of the jury's role by
informing the jury that if the letter of law will result in an mjus-
tice, it should not be applied to the present case. Finally, Ms.
Pratt-Pullar argued that a nullification instruction enhances the
separation of powers by providing a check on the power of judg-
es.132
b. Arguments in Opposition to the Washington Proposal
In response to these arguments, the Washington State Senators
expressed several troubling considerations. Senator Smith argued
that providing a nullification instruction did not simply inform
jurors of a right they already possessed but, in fact, expanded the
power of the jury 133 Smith argued that the legislature, not juries,
128. Id (testimony of Richard Shepard).
129. Id.
130. Id. Mr. Shepard added to these basic arguments that jury nullification is democracy
in its purest form. Jury nullification constitutes democracy in its purest form because it is
the epitome of government by the people. Nullification, it is argued, provides accurate
feedback to the legislators about the laws they have passed. In addition, it increases the
public's respect for the laws by weeding out the unpopular and meffective laws. Id.
131. Id (statements of Richard Shepard and DeAnn Pratt-Pullar on behalf of the Liber-
tarian Party).
132. Id The jury will act as a check on judicial power as well as legislative authority
by refusing to enforce laws they consider to be unjust or unconstitutional. Id.
133. Id; see also Simson, supra note 6, at 503-07. Simson agrees with Senator Smith's
characterization of the history of jury nullification, that juries never possessed the right to
nullify the law, but, they possess simply the power to do so. Simson opines that there is
a significant difference between the jury's right to decide the law and the jury's right to
nullify the law. Id. To decide the law is to step into the shoes of judges and decide the
law by the same standards as used by judges. Id. The right to nullify the law, however,
is the right of the jury to define blameworthy conduct according to their own notions of
justice. Nullifying the law is not concerned with the making of law but only with de-
ciding whether punishing the particular defendant for what he has done would be fair. Id.
112319931
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had the power to make laws, and thus, this instruction would give
the jury powers outside of its purpose and authority "M At the
same time, Smith continued, the power of the legislature to make
laws applicable to all the citizens of its state would be nulli-
fied 13
5
Another issue raised by Senator Smith focused on the concept
that nullification was not, as Mr. Shepard contended, democracy in
its purest form, but rather was the antithesis of democracy A
nullification instruction would allow twelve individuals, not elected
as legislators or judges, and not representing a majority of any
constituency, to make the law 1
The final argument raised in opposition to the proposed legisla-
tion by several of the senators, including Senators Smith and
Hamer, contended that the proposed law would result in unwarrant-
ed convictions and acquittals. The fear, as expressed by the sena-
tors, is that a few unreasonable jurors will allow their personal
prejudices to enter into their decisions, resulting in a conviction of
those who are not guilty under the law or an acquittal of those
Conceding that there was a common law right in colonial times for junes to decide the
law, Simson concludes that there is no evidence that the right to nullify the law existed
at common law. Id.
134. Smith's theory that juries would be making laws if told they could nullify the law
is based on the idea that every time a verdict is decided in court, law has been made, at
least with respect to the parties to that case. Wash. S. Hearings, supra note 126. But see
Simson, supra note 6, at 503-07 (distinguishing between the right to decide the law and
to nullify the law). Siison argues that at common law juries had the right to decide the
law, meaning they used the same standards a judge would to decide what the law should
be. Sinson demes, however, that juries had the right to nullify the law, or, in other
words, to refuse to apply a valid law to a particular defendant due to considerations of
fairness and justice. Id. According to Simson's characterization of the history of jury
nullification, then, Smith's notion that the right to nullify the law is the right to make the
law was not supported by colonial judges and lawmakers who obviously saw a significant
difference between the right to make or decide law and the right to nullify the law. Id.
135. Washington Senate Hearings, supra note 126.
136. lad Studies show that, in fact, juries are not the cross-section of society they were
intended to be. "Mhe available research evidence has on the whole demonstrated
how fundamentally unrepresentative of the wider community jurors tend to be." JoHN
BALDwIN & MICHAEL MCCoNVILLE, JURY TRLAlS 91 (1979).
[I]n most courts in the United States significant segments of the population are
still not included on juries as often as they would be in a completely random
system aimed at impaneling a representative cross-section. Blue-collar workers,
non-whites, the young, the elderly, and women are the groups most widely
underrepresented on juries, and in many jurisdictions, the underrepresentation of
these groups is substantial and dramatic.
JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO
REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 24 (1977).
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who are guilty and for whom considerations of justice do not de-
mand an acquittal.1
37
In addition to arguments against nullification raised by mem-
bers of the Washington Senate, the Superior Court Judge's Associ-
ation for the State of Washington submitted a letter to the state
legislature m opposition to the proposed legislation. 138  The
grounds for opposition were stated as follows: "This bill creates a
fundamentally inconsistent position for the court. The judge is
sworn to uphold the law, and this bill requires the judge to instruct
the jury to disregard the law "139
The issues, then, which seem to have dominated the hearings
on the jury rights bill in Washington are common law rights to
nullify the law, justice versus lawfulness, enhancement of separa-
tion of powers, maintenance of democratic institutions, and finally,
unwarranted convictions or acquittals by virtue of the nullification
instruction. Similar issues arose in the hearings before the Texas
House of Representatives.
2. Texas Legislative Hearings
The Texas proposal vanes in several ways from the bill pro-
posed in Washington. Most significantly, while the Washington bill
would only require the nullification instruction to be given in crim-
inal cases, the Texas proposal would require it in all cases, civil as
well as criminal."4
a. Arguments in Favor of the Texas Proposal
The arguments in favor of the Texas legislation are quite simi-
lar to those raised in the Washington hearings. The first argument
137. Washington Senate Hearings, supra note 126. Proponents of jury nullification re-
spond to the first part of this argument by pointing out that a conviction is appealable
and, therefore, if the evidence to support a conviction does not exist, it will be over-
turned on appeal. ALd (testimony of Richard Shepard). The second part of tis argument,
however, is justifiable. If a jury refuses to convict a person based on personal prejudices
it is not appealable. The classic example of this problem is a jury who would refuse to
convict a white man for killing a black man. Id.
138. Letter from James D. McCutcheon, Jr. to Senator Gary A. Nelson (March 4,
1991).
139. Id.
140. Compare S. 5356, 52nd Leg., 1991 Wash. Reg. Sess. with Texas H. 25, 72nd
Leg., 1991 Texas Reg. Sess. The language of the Texas proposal does not distinguish
between civil and criminal trials. See Texas H. 25. There was no question raised at the
hearings that the proposed legislation would be applicable in all cases, both civil and
criminal. Hearings on Texas House Bill 25 Before the Committee on Criminal Jurrspru-
dence, 72nd Texas Leg., Regular Session (1991) [hereinafter Texas Hearings].
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raised in support of the proposed jury rights legislation in Texas
was that juries already have the right to nullify the law; the legis-
lation, it was argued, would merely require judges to inform juries
of this right and stop deceiving them. 41  A second argument in
support of this legislation is that it enhances democratic participa-
tion in the legislative process. By giving jurors the power of nulli-
fication, juries will be able to establish patterns of acquittals of
charges brought pursuant to laws which they find to be unjust.
This will be a source of feedback to the legislature. Thus, the pow-
er of nullification provides the people with a mechanism to make
their opinions regarding specific laws known to their elected repre-
sentatives. "
b. Arguments in Opposition to the Texas Proposal
While the arguments advanced in support of the legislation
were the same as those put forth in the Washington Senate hear-
ings, the criticisms and arguments against the legislation in Texas
were far more extensive. Some of the concerns expressed about the
Texas legislation were similar to concerns raised about the pro-
posed legislation in Washington: a concern about consistency
among the application of the laws;.4 a concern that our system
is intended to operate on the rule of law;" concerns over unwar-
141. Tlus argument was raised by almost every person speaking in favor of this legis-
lation. See Texas Hearings, supra note 140. There are two bases for this argument. The
first is that the right to nullify is historically based in the common law. The second
source for tis argument is the Texas Constitution itself. Article I, § 8 of the Texas Con-
stitution provides that juries in libel cases as in other cases have the right to determine
the law. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 8. Proponents focus on the "as in other cases" language to
argue that juries were given the right to nullify the law in the Constitution of Texas and
that, therefore, tis bill creates no new rights. Texas Hearings, supra note 140.
142. Texas Hearings, supra note 140 (testimony of Tom Glass).
143. Compare Wash. Hearings, supra note 126, with Texas Hearings, supra note 140.
One of the frst arguments raised by the Texas State Representatives against this legisla-
tion is that it will lessen consistency. Laws will no longer be applied across the board to
all persons residing in the state but will, instead, be applied to some but not to others
depending on the jury. The response to this argument was threefold. First, it was said
that laws are not strictly and consistently enforced anyway because of such elements as
prosecutorial discretion, jury discretion and police discretion. Second, nullification only oc-
curs in rare cases so the consistency problem would not be widespread. Finally, it was
stated that inconsistency should be preferred to the consistent application of bad law.
Texas Hearings, supra note 140 (testimony of Greg Clark and Tom Glass). Bruce
Baechler, representative for the Libertarian Party, also responded to this argument by Rep.
Flouner, saying that the power of the legislature should be limited because only the citi-
zenry should be all powerful. 141 (testimony of Bruce Baechler).
144. Compare Wash. Hearings, supra note 126, with Texas Hearings, supra note 140.
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ranted convictions and the supposed remedy of appeal;1 4 and
concerns with jury nullification procedures."4
In addition to these arguments, however, many of the concerns
raised in the Texas hearings related to specific provisions in the
Texas proposal and were, therefore, unique. First, the Texas pro-
posal was criticized as being too broad because it would apply in
both civil and criminal trials. 47 The purpose of nullification, it
was argued, is to protect people from the government, not to re-
lease them from contractual obligations they voluntarily entered
into with other private citizens.14' A second problem specific to
the Texas proposal was its impact on existing laws. Daniel Jordan,
speaking on behalf of the Texas Association of Defense Counsel,
argued that if this legislation was enacted many other laws and
regulations, particularly the rules of civil and criminal procedure,
would have to be changed.1 49 In addition, a recognition that tlus
is not a new right but rather already existed in the Texas State
Constitution, as many of the bill's proponents argued, would con-
stitute a reason for the reversal of all the cases previously tried
under the present rules of procedure."5
The rule of law is essential for the perception of fairness. Without the rule of law, a
particular jury can enact tyranny in a particular case by depriving the parties involved of
the right to have their case decided by the laws of the state. Texas Hearings, supra note
140 (testimony of Daniel Jordan, on behalf of Texas Association of Defense Counsel).
145. Compare Wash. Senate Hearings, supra note 126, with Texas Hearings, supra note
140. Mr. Daniel Jordan, on behalf of the Texas Association of Defense Counsel, in oppo-
sition to this legislation, argued that the purported protection against unwarranted convic-
tions by virtue of the appeals process is not as safe as it appears. Mr. Jordan argues that
in order to overturn a conviction on appeal, prejudice or harmful error must be shown.
This could prove an extremely difficult task since there is no way of knowing what a
jury is thinking when it makes a particular decision. A related problem raised by Mr.
Jordan is that this instruction essentially tells jurors that they should let bias, prejudice
and sympathies play a part in their decisions. Thus, the jury essentially becomes like a
ling with no accountability and, therefore, no way to be reversed on appeal, although
such elements have played a part in the verdict. See Texas Hearings, supra note 140.
146. Compare Wash. Hearings, supra note 126, wth Texas Hearings, supra note 140.
Another issue raised by Mr. Jordan is the problem of excusing jurors. Under thLs legisla-
tion no juror may be excused for expressing a willingness to nullify the law. The prob-
lem wich arises, then, is that any juror who expresses such a sentiment will not be able
to be excused either for cause or peremptorily because it would be difficult to prove that
the exclusion was not a result of the juror's expressed belief in nullification. Texas
Hearings, supra note 140 (testimony of Daniel Jordan).
147. Texas Hearings, supra note 140.
148. Id. (testimony of Tom Glass).
149. Id. (testimony of Daniel Jordan).
150. Id. (testimony of Daniel Jordan).
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3. Legislative Proceedings in Other States
The only other states which maintained any sort of record or
transcript of the hearings were Arizona and Massachusetts. The
proposal in Arizona was for a constitutional amendment which
would require judges to inform jurors of their inherent right to
judge the law when the state or one of its political subdivisions
was a party to the case."' The main thrust of the argument in
support of this resolution appears to be, once again, that nullifica-
tion is a right that all jurors possess and of which they ought to be
informed. 52 In opposition to this proposal the following senti-
ments were expressed: that the law which was proposed is too
broad and does not provide any standards for its application;" 3
that this law is a threat to justice under the law;"54 and, that this
resolution will not correct misapplication of the law 155
Finally, m Massachusetts the following letter was submitted by
Robert Bloom, Deputy Administrative Assistant to the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts in opposition to the proposed jury
rights legislation:
[The proposed legislation] would require that jury hand-
books Inform jurors of "their obligation, right, and duty, to
judge according to their conscience."
In effect, these bills require the Judicial Branch of
government to insert in court prepared handbooks a state-
ment that jurors are obliged to nullify or disregard the law
in certain situations. Such legislation would be disruptive of
the good order of the administration of justice. It also may
be unconstitutional under the Separation of Powers provi-
sion (Article 30) of the Massachusetts Constitution.
This office strongly opposes [this legislation]. 56
151. See supra note 102 and accompanying text for the Arizona proposal.
152. Hearing on H.C.R. 2015 Before the Arizona House of Representatives, Committee
on the Judiciary, 40th Leg., First Regular Session (March 11, 1991) (testimony of Richard
Tompkins, State Coordinator, Fully Informed Jury Association, and Darlene Span).
153. Id. (testimony of Judge Noel Fidel, Court of Appeals). Judge Fidel is presently
publishing a two year study on jury nullification m the Arizona State Umversity Law
Journal.
154. Id. (testimony of Dee Sirlas, on behalf of the League of Women Voters of Arizo-
na). It is not apparent from the transcript summary of Ms. Siras' testimony precisely why
she regards tlus proposal as a threat to justice.
155. Id. (response of John Taylor, Court of Appeals, representing the Legislative Com-
mittee of the Arizona Judicial Council, to a question posed by Rep. Horton).
156. Memorandum from Robert Bloom, Deputy Adinimstrative Assistant of the Supreme
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Thus, the opposition in Massachusetts appears to be based on the
notion that the proposed legislation would not merely be disruptive
of the administration of justice, but might possibly be m violation
of the Massachusetts constitutional provision on the separation of
powers.
New York, Louisiana, and Tennessee, the other states where
jury nullification legislation was introduced last year, either did not
hold hearings or failed to keep a record of the proceedings."5
The same arguments raised with respect to the Arizona, Texas,
Washington and Massachusetts proposals, however, would presum-
ably be applicable to the proposals m New York, Louisiana and
Tennessee. The preceding discussion indicates that many of the
issues raised were common to all the states. The most important
considerations in support of the legislation were: 1) that jurors
already possessed the right to nullify the law by virtue of the
common law and should, therefore, be informed of this right; and
2) that a nullification instruction would promote justice, democratic
participation, and separation of power values.15 1 In opposition to
the proposals, the recurrent themes were: 1) that a nullification in-
struction would expand the powers of the jury while negating the
power of the legislature to make laws applicable to all persons of a
particular state, thereby decreasing consistency in application of the
laws; 2) that such an instruction would actually be the antithesis of
democracy; 3) that it may result in unwarranted convictions or ac-
quittals with no effective remedy on appeal; and 4) that the pro-
posed legislation will cause serious procedural problems in jury
selection.'5 9 In addition to these common criticisms, criticisms
which are specific to the legislation introduced, such as the breadth
of the proposal," its lack of standards,'6 1 and the implications
for existing state laws and decisions,162 have also been raised.
The common pros and cons which have been presented in the
legislative hearings provide a basis for further assessment of the
legislative proposals. Any proposed legislation ought to incorporate
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, to Senator Michael LoPresti, Chanrman of the Joint Com-
mittee on the Judiciary (March 19, 1991) (citation omitted).
157. See supra notes 105-06, 116, and 118-19 and accompanying text (describing New
York S. 1085, Louisiana L 1682, and Tennessee H. 430, respectively).
158. See supra notes 128-32, 141-42, and 152 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 133-39, 143-50, and 153-55 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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the good aspects of the past legislative proposals, while avoiding
the pitfalls exposed by the criticisms.
B. Comparison of Proposed Legislation to Current Laws
Enacted in Maryland and Indiana
Currently, there are two states, Maryland and Indiana, which
require that a nullification instruction be given in particular cas-
es.' 63 Article XV, Section 5 of the Maryland Constitution states:
"In the trial of all criminal cases, the Jury shall be the Judges of
Law, as well as of fact, except that the Court may pass upon the
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction. " "6i As a result
of this constitutional provision, the following instruction is usually
given to juries in criminal cases:
Members of the jury, this is a criminal case and under the
constitution and laws of the State of Maryland in a crimi-
nal case the jury are the judges of the law as well as of
the facts in the case. So that whatever I tell you about the
law while it is intended to be helpful to you in reaching a
just and proper verdict in the case, it is not binding upon
you as members of the jury and you may accept the law as
you apprehend it to be in the case. 65
In Indiana, Article I, Section 19 of the Indiana Constitution states:
"In all criminal cases whatsoever, the jury shall have the right to
determine the law and the facts." 166
1. Interpretation of the Maryland and Indiana Provisions
How these instructions work in practice in Indiana and Mary-
163. IND. CONST., art. I, § 19; MD. CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. XXIII. See
Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 4, at 79 (discussing how jury nullification works m
practice today in Maryland and Indiana, the only two states which allow it); Scheflin, su-
pra note 1, at 201-02 (discussing the current state of the jury nullification doctrine and
stating that only Maryland and Indiana presently have effective constitutional provisions
giving jurors the right to determine the law as well as the facts). The state of Georgia
also has a statutory provision preserving the right of the jury to decide the law: "[Tihe
jury shall be the judges of the law and the facts in the trial of all crumnal cases and
shall give a general verdict of 'guilty, or 'not guilty." GA. CODE ANN. § 17-9-2 (Miclue
1990). The Georgia Supreme Court, however, has refused to interpret this provision as
requiring or even allowing courts to tell jurors of their right to decide the law. See
Brown v. State, 40 Ga. 689 (1870).
164. MD. CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. XXIII.
165. Wyley v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 372 F.2d 742, 743 n.l (4th Cir. 1967);
Scheflin, supra note 1, at 202; Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 4, at 83.
166. IND. CONST., art. I, § 19.
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land has been the subject of much scholarly research."6 The nul-
lification instruction in Indiana has not been shown to have
wreaked havoc on the judicial process. To the contrary, jurors seem
to be behaving responsibly 168 There is no evidence of a higher
acquittal rate or that judges are unhappy with the provision.169
The appellate courts seem to be doing a good job of drawing a
balance between the role of the juries and the rights of the ac-
cused. 70
The situation in Maryland appears to be largely the same.'
167. See, e.g., Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 4, at 80-85 (discussing how jury nul-
lification works in practice today). The extent of the jury's right to determine questions of
the constitutionality of a law under Indiana's nullification instruction provision is not
entirely clear. Earlier cases held that the provision allowed juries to pass only on the
applicability of a law but not on its constitutionality. See, e.g., Sumpter v. State, 306
N.E.2d 95, 102 (Ind. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 952 (1976). In Taylor v. State, 420
N.E.2d 1231 (Ind. 1981), however, the Indiana Supreme Court criticized Sumpter, con-
cluding that it is proper for defense counsel to argue the constitutionality of the statute at
issue to the jury. Taylor, 420 N.E.2d at 1233. Nevertheless, the court did not agree with
the contention that the judge was required to give the jury instruction proffered by the
defendant regarding the defense theory of the constitutionality of the law at issue. Id. The
Indiana Supreme Court has also specifically rejected the jury's power, by virtue of the
nullification instruction, to create new offenses or find a defendant guilty of a crime with
which he has not been charged. Denson v. State, 330 N.E.2d 734, 737 (Ind. 1975);
Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 4, at 80.
On several occasions, the Indiana courts have discussed the question of whether ju-
nes may convict defendants for a lesser offense when the evidence does not support a
conviction for the offense charged. Current law holds that a defendant may only be con-
victed of a lesser offense when it is a lesser included offense. Scheflin & Van Dyke,
supra note 4, at 81. See also Holloway v. State, 352 N.E.2d 523 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976)
(holding that Indiana juries cannot alter the legislative requirements for convictions even
when convicting for a lesser offense; thus, juries are only authorized to convict for a
lesser included offense).
A fourth issue which has arisen in Indiana with respect to the nullification instruc-
tion is whether the court can give the jury mandatory instructions. The Indiana courts
have held that the trial judge may not tell the jurors they must convict if they find cer-
tam facts but may explain the law to the jurors and give them guidelines and examples
about how the law was meant to be applied. Pritchard v. State, 230 N.E.2d 416, 418-19
(Ind. 1967); Powell v. State, 312 N.E.2d 521 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974); Scheflin & Van Dyke,
supra note 4, at 82. Jurors are also told they "have the right to determine and construe
the law [themselves], although [their] determunation may differ from [the judge's]." Sankey
v. State, 301 N.E.2d 235, 239 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973). See also Scheflin & Van Dyke,
supra note 4, at 82. Finally, the attorney's role in discussing the law with the jury has
not yet been resolved in Indiana. Id.
168. Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 4, at 82.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. The instruction, for instance, does not empower jurors to declare a statute uncon-
stitutional or permit lawyers to argue to a jury that a statute is unconstitutional. Franklin
v. State, 12 Md. 236 (1858). See also Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 4, at 83. Ad-
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A survey of judges m Maryland reveals that most support the nul-
lification instruction even if not m support of the theory of nullifi-
cation, and that most believe its impact on jury decisions has been
margmal. 72 Professor Jacobsohn, who conducted this study, con-
cludes that:
It appears, then, that the traditional deference to the judge's
authority is not seriously, if at all, diminished by the advi-
sory nature of judges' instructions in Maryland. Neverthe-
less, the fact that more than one out of every four judges
believes that counsel's interpretations of the law constitute
an important source of juror legal awareness calls attention
to the difference between Maryland's practice and that of
other junsdictions. 73
In sum, the instruction in Maryland, at least from the judges' per-
spective, seems to have no real impact on conviction and acquittal
rates, but has merely provided another source from which juries
may obtain their idea of what the law is or requires.174
The importance of these provisions and how they have worked
in practice is key to understanding how the proposed legislation
ditionally, a number of safeguards have been built into the trial process to protect the ac-
cused from a jury that mght act improperly. For instance, the trial judge decides all
questions concerning the admssibility of evidence; if either party requests the judge to do
so, he must provide the jury with an advisory instruction on the law; if the trial judge
thinks insufficient evidence exists to support a jury verdict of guilty, he or she is empow-
ered to issue a directed verdict of acquittal; and if the jury has misapplied the law to the
prejudice of the accused, the trial judge can order a new trial. Id. at 82 (describing van-
ous safeguards which have been built into the trial process). The Supreme Court of Mary-
land can review the sufficiency of the evidence if the defendant argues on appeal that the
jury's conviction is improper and the error was preserved at trial. See Giles v. State, 183
A.2d 359, 366 (1962), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 372
U.S. 67 (1963). See also Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 4, at 83. Finally, attorneys
are allowed to argue the law to the jury and to present any disagreement about the appli-
cable law to the jurors for their resolution. Lewis v. State, 237 A.2d 73, 78 (Md. CL
App. 1968). See also Scheflin, supra note 4, at 83. The judge may dispute the attorney's
interpretation of the law, however, and present his own views of the law in an advisory
instruction. See Schanker v. State, 116 A.2d 363, 366-67 (Md. 1955); Slansky v. State, 63
A.2d 599, 604 (Md. 1949). See also Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 4, at 83-84.
172. Gary J. Jacobsohn, The Right to Disagree: Judges, Juries, and the Administration
of Criminal Justice in Maryland, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 571, 582-600. Of 44 judges sur-
veyed, only three felt trial outcomes were frequently affected by the instruction and anoth-
er eight felt that the outcome was occasionally affected. Only eight judges felt the instruc-
tion should be repealed. Of 36 judges responding to their personal opinion on nullifica-
tion, 22 disapproved of it. Id.
173. Id. at 581.
174. Id. at 587.
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discussed earlier would work in practice, and how it might be
modified to work as successfully as it arguably has in Maryland
and Indiana. 175
2. Comparison of Maryland and Indiana Provisions to Recent
Legislative Proposals
The most obvious difference between the constitutional provi-
sions of Indiana and Maryland, and some of the proposals mtro-
duced recently in other states, is the scope of the application of the
nullification instruction. In Indiana and Maryland the application of
the nullification instruction has been restricted to criminal tri-
als.176 In Arizona, Massachusetts, Tennessee and Texas the pro-
posed nullification instructions would be applicable beyond just
criminal jury trials."7 In Arizona and Tennessee, the instruction
would apply in any case in which the government is a party, civil
or criminal. 171 In Massachusetts and Texas, the scope is even
greater: the proposed legislation would require the nullification
instruction to be given in all jury trials. 79 In Washington, New
York, and Louisiana, however, the scope of the proposed legisla-
tion is essentially the same as the provisions in Maryland and In-
diana, applicable only in criminal trials by jury "'
The most critical difference, however, between the Maryland
and Indiana provisions and the proposals introduced last year is in
the explicitness of the nullification instruction. An explicitly word-
ed instruction informs the jury directly that they have the authority
to decide whether to apply a law to the defendant's conduct, that
they may include in their deliberations their own feelings based on
conscience, and that they may refuse to apply the applicable law to
the defendant if they feel the result would be unjust."' The
175. The constitutional provisions in Maryland and Indiana have been successful in that
they have not resulted in the chaos or anarchy that nullification opponents predicted. See
supra notes 159, 168 and accompanying text. The fact that judges perceive no real impact
from the instruction indicates, however, that these provisions may not be successful from
the viewpoint of jury nullification proponents.
176. See IND. CONST., art. I, § 19; MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, § 25.
177. See supra notes 102, 109, 118, and 122 and accompanying text (setting forth the
legislation proposed in these states).
178. See supra notes 102-04, 118-19 and accompanying text (discussing legislation pro-
posed in Arizona and Tennessee).
179. See supra notes 109-13, 122-24 and accompanying text (discussing legislation pro-
posed in Massachusetts and Texas).
180. See supra notes 95-101, 105-07, 116, and accompanying text (discussing legislation
proposed in Washington, New York, and Louisiana).
181. According to Horowitz there are three elements to an explicit, or radical, nullifica-
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Maryland instruction, in particular, is often regarded as vaguely
worded." Washington, New York, Massachusetts, Tennessee and
Texas proposed legislation which would appear to qualify as ex-
plicit jury nullification instructions,5 3 while Arizona and Louisi-
ana proposed language much more similar to that contained in the
Maryland instruction.1' 4 Empirical research has proven that the
explicitness of the nullification instruction has a definite impact on
verdicts.185
Another difference between the proposed legislation and the
enacted legislation stems from the fact that the constitutional provi-
sions of Indiana and Maryland are very general provisions or state-
ments of the law 186 This has allowed the courts of these states
to interpret the provisions and their applicability 187 In doing so,
courts have been able to draw a balance between the fulfillment of
the jury's role and protection of the defendant's nghts.188  By
contrast, in much of the proposed legislation, it appears that the
drafters are trying to cover all possible scenarios which might arise
under such legislation. While this will provide a more ready an-
swer in case of a dispute, it detracts from the flexibility which has
proven beneficial in the application of the Maryland and Indiana
tion instruction:
1) "Although they are a public body bound to give respectful attention to
the laws, they have the final authority to decide whether or not to apply a
given law to the acts of the defendant on trial before them";
2) That "they represent [the community] and that it is appropriate to bring
into their deliberations the feelings of the community and their own feelings
based on conscience";
3) And, jurors are told that despite their respect for the law, "nothing
would bar them from acquitting the defendant if they feel that the law, as
applied to the fact situation before them, would produce an inequitable or un-
just result."
Horowitz, supra note 4, at 30-31 (citations omitted).
182. See td. at 29 ("Proponents of the nullification doctrine feel that the Maryland in-
struction is too vaguely worded to have a substantial impact.").
183. See supra notes 95-101, 105-07, 109, 118-19, and 122-24 (discussing the proposed
legislation).
184. Compare H.C.1. 2015, supra note 102 and H. 1682, supra note 114 with MD.
CONST., Art. XV, § 5.
185. See infra notes 205, 215-17 and accompanying text (discussing the conclusions of
the empirical research of Irwin A. Horowitz).
186. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text (explaining the constitutional provi-
sions of Maryland and Indiana and their corresponding jury instructions).
187. See supra notes 167-74 and accompanying text (discussing how the Maryland and
Indiana provisions have been applied in practice).
188. See supra notes 167, 171 and accompanying text (discussing how the courts have
interpreted the constitutional provisions in Maryland and Indiana).
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provisions, and has also spawned much of the criticism of these
proposals.189
In addition, there are a few other elements included m the
recently proposed legislation and visibly absent from the enacted
Indiana and Maryland constitutional provisions. For instance, nei-
ther the Indiana or Maryland provisions make reference to the
ability of attorneys or judges to excuse a juror who expresses a
willingness to nullify the law '90 On the other hand, the legisla-
tion proposed in Washington, Tennessee and Texas all contain
provisions stating that a juror may not be disqualified for express-
ing a willingness to nullify the law 191 This aspect of the legisla-
tion was presented as one of the more troublesome provisions of
the law in the Texas House of Representatives hearings on the
bill.' 92
3. Relevance of Comparing the Enacted Legislation to the
Proposed Legislation
There are several lessons to be learned from the Maryland and
Indiana instructions and how they have worked in practice. First,
neither of these provisions have spawned much, if any, controver-
sy; to the contrary, they have both operated apparently without
incident. 93 This tends to refute the claims of jury nullification
opponents that jury nullification instructions will result in chaos
and anarchy 194 On the other hand, the fact that the instruction
has had no perceptable impact indicates that it is not having the
effect desired by jury nullification proponents. 95
The differences pointed out above between the Maryland and
Indiana provisions and the legislation proposed in 1991 are helpful
in evaluating why the Maryland and Indiana provisions have had
this effect and in determining what changes must be incorporated
in any future proposals. First, the lack of detail in the Maryland
and Indiana provisions appears to account for the lack of contro-
189. See supra text accompanying notes 148-50 (criticizing particular provisions of the
proposed legislation). Of the legislative proposals made m 1991, only Arizona and Louisi-
ana have maintained the more general and less detailed approach taken by Maryland and
Indiana. See supra notes 95, 102, 105, 109, 114, 118, and 122 (detailing the language of
the legislative proposals m the seven states introducing jury rights legislation m 1991).
190. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 95, 118, 122 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 146.
193. See supra notes 167-74 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 168-74 and accompanying text.
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versy and the smooth operation of these provisions."g Second,
the vagueness of the Maryland and Indiana provisions accounts for
its lack of effectiveness from the proponents' point of view 197
In conclusion, the experiences of Maryland and Indiana with
jury nullification instructions demonstrate that, m order to achieve
the results desired by jury nullification proponents but avoid the
chaos predicted by opponents, any future legislative proposals must
contain both a more explicit -jury nullification instruction and a less
detailed approach to how the legislation will work in practice.
C. Empirical Studies on Jury Nullification Instructions
Of the research that has been undertaken, two studies seem
particularly applicable to the jury nullification issue. 198 The first
is a study conducted by Irwin A. Horowitz in the early 1980's
"aimed at providing empirical data for the following question: will
the jury operate in a manner which is different than its normal
functioning if given explicit nullification instructions?"199 The
second study was also conducted by Horowitz, several years lat-
er.2" This study "was conducted to determine the effects of nulli-
fication information to the jury from judge's instructions and
lawyers' arguments on juries' verdicts and decision mak-
ing 1,201 The results of these studies will provide insight into
some of the more subtle problems with various types of nullifica-
tion instruction schemes and present alternative means for accom-
plishing the ultimate purpose of drafting an appropriate legislative
proposal for a jury nullification instruction.
In his first study concerning the operation of juries when given
explicit nullification instructions, Horowitz divided forty-five six-
person juries into nine experimental groups. 2' 2 Three different
nullification instructions were then combined with three different
types of criminal cases and each group was given one of the com-
196. See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
197. See nfra notes 206-17 and accompanying text.
198. Both of these studies were conducted by Irwin A. Horowitz of the University of
Toledo Department of Psychology. The author has not discovered any other articles which
refer to the studies by Mr. Horowitz and cannot personally vouch for their scholarly
value.
199. Horowitz, supra note 4, at 25.
200. Irwin A. Horowitz, Jury Nullification: The Impact of Judicial Instructions, Argu-
ments, and Challenges on Jury Decision Making, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439 (1988).
201. Id.
202. Horowitz, supra note 4, at 31.
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binations.2 °3 The three types of criminal cases used in this study
were a euthanasia case, a murder case, and a drunk driving
case.' °4 The three instructions administered consisted of a Stan-
dard Pattern Instruction, the Maryland Instruction, and a Radical
Nullification Instruction.2°
The results of the study showed that the verdicts handed down
by juries given the radical nullification instruction differed signifi-
203. Id. at 30.
204. In the euthanasia case, a nurse was being tried for the "mercy" killing of a temu-
nal cancer patient. Although the nurse was portrayed in very sympathetic terms, the evi-
dence presented made clear that the nurse had deliberately ended her patient's life. In
addition, there was testimony from the patient's wife indicating her husband's tremendous
suffering and lus hope that he would soon die. The murder case involved the killing of a
grocery store owner during a robbery. The defendant was arrested near the store with the
cash register receipts still in hIs pockets. Additionally, witnesses were able to identify the
defendant as the robber. In the third case, a drink driving case involving vehicular hom-
cide, a male college student killed one pedestrian and seriously injured another while
driving home from a party where he had been seen to consume several alcoholic beverag-
es. In his favor, however, the evidence showed that the accident took place at about one
o'clock on a foggy morning, on a freeway exit which may not have been adequately lit.
The victims were walking along the shoulder of the road, dressed in dark clothes, carry-
ing a gas can. Yet, the evidence also showed that the victims were thrown over 100 feet
from the point of impact, indicating that the defendant was driving very fast at the time
of the accident Horowitz, supra note 4, at 31.
205. Id. at 30. The Standard Pattern Instructions were taken from the Ohio Pattern Jury
Instructions and do not refer to nullification at all. Id. The Maryland Instructions em-
ployed the Pattern Maryland Instructions and do contain a nullification instruction, though
vague. Id. The Maryland Instruction states:
Members of the Jury, this is a criminal case and under the Constitution and
laws of the State of Maryland m a criminal case the jury are the judges [sic]
of the law as well as of the facts m the case. So that whatever I tell you
about the law while it is intended to be helpful to you in reaching a just and
proper verdict in the case, it is not binding upon you as members of the jury
and you may accept the law as you apprehend it to be in the case.
Wyley v. Warden, 372 F.2d 742, 743 n.1 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 863
(1967).
Finally, the Radical Nullification Instructions are the most explicit as to the jury's
power to nullify the law. Tins instruction tells the jurors the following:
1. Although they are a public body bound to give respectful attention to
the laws, they have the final authority to decide whether or not to apply a
given law to the acts of the defendant on trial before them;
2. That they represent (the community) and that it is appropriate to bnng
into their deliberations the feelings of the community and their own feelings
based on conscience;
3. And, jurors were told that despite their respect for the law, nothing
would bar them from acquitting the defendant if they feel that the law, as
applied to the fact situation before them, would produce an inequitable or un-
just result.
Horowitz, supra note 4, at 30-31. This instruction is based on a proposal by Jon Van
Dyke. Van Dyke, supra note 45, at 241.
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cantly from those reached by juries given either the standard pat-
tern instruction or the Maryland instruction in both the euthanasia
case and the drunk driving case.2°6 In the euthanasia case, the ju-
rors given the radical nullification instruction acquitted the defen-
dant more often than the jurors given the standard pattern instruc-
tion or the Maryland instruction.2' The juries given the standard
pattern instruction and Maryland instruction differed only slightly
and insignificantly in their verdicts in the euthanasia case.2"
The other case m which the instruction had a significant effect
on the verdict was in the drunk driving case. The effect in this
case, however, is both surprising and disturbing. The jurors given
the radical nullification instruction convicted more often in this
case than either the jurors given the standard pattern instructions or
the Maryland instructions, who convicted at the same rate.2"
Horowitz observes:
If, in fact, the higher verdict scores (more guilt-prone
scores), and the absence of a not guilty verdict by any of
the five [radical nullification instruction] juries, are due to
the receipt of the nullification instructions, then we can see
that juries "liberated" by appeals to their conscience may
impose more or less severe penalties than is common de-
pending upon the nature of the case.21°
206. Horowitz, supra note 4, at 32.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. The table set out below reflects the actual differences m verdict scores among
the different groups. Each juror was asked initially to rank the defendant's guilt or in-
nocence on a scale of 1 to 6, with 1 - evidence well below a reasonable doubt, 2 -
evidence moderately below a reasonable doubt, 3 - evidence slightly below a reasonable
doubt, 4 - evidence slightly above a reasonable doubt, 5 - evidence moderately above a
reasonable doubt, and 6 - evidence well above a reasonable doubt. The jury as a group,
then, reached a consensus as to the appropriate scale value. These values were averaged
with those of the other juries in the group to reach the values reflected below.
Cases Instructions
SPI MI RNI
Murder 5.0 4.8 5.4
Drunk Driving 4.2 4.2 5.4
Euthanasia 4.2 3.8 2.6
Horowitz concluded that the only significant differences reflected above were the
differences between the RNI (Radical Nullification Instructions) jurors and the SPI (Stan-
dard Pattern Instructions) jurors and the MI (Maryland Instructions) jurors in the drunk
driving and euthanasia cases. Id.
210. Id. at 35. This result is disturbing because it indicates that the fears of jury nul-
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The other trend evidenced by this study is that juries in receipt
of radical nullification instructions do in fact function differently
than juries which are given either the standard pattern or the Mary-
land instructions." The content analysis of the jury deliberations
indicate that while radical nullification instruction juries are aware
of the nullification instructions, Maryland instruction juries do not
appear to be any more aware of the nullification possibility inher-
ent in their instructions than the standard pattern instruction ju-
ries.21 Additionally, the radical nullification instruction juries in
both the drunk driving and euthanasia case spent significantly more
time than either the standard pattern instruction juries or the Mary-
land instruction juries discussing the nullification instruction and, to
a lesser degree, the character of the defendant, and significantly
less time discussing the evidence in the case.213 Finally, both the
radical nullification instruction juries and the Maryland instruction
juries spent significantly more time in deliberations relating person-
al experiences to the case than the standard pattern instruction ju-
ries did.214
Essentially, the results of this study indicate three important
effects of jury nullification instructions on how juries function.
First, in general, juries given radical nullification instructions do
function differently than juries not given such instructions.215 Sec-
ond, juries which are given radical nullification instructions do give
significantly different verdicts in some instances.216 Finally, radi-
cal nullification instruction juries focus more heavily in their delib-
erations on such factors as personal experiences and defendant
characteristics.2 7
lification critics - that a jury nullification instruction will result m wrongful convictions
- may not be completely unwarranted. Although the conviction m the drunk driving case
does not appear unwarranted, the fact that jurors in receipt of radical nullification instruc-
tions convicted at a lugher rate than other jurors does indicate that the jurors allowed
their personal feelings and prejudices about drunk driving to affect their decision to con-
vict the defendant rather than simply to acquit as the instruction provides.
211. Id. at 34.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 33.
214. Id. at 34.
215. Id. at 35.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 35-36. As discussed supra at notes 206-14 and accompanying text, the
Maryland and the standard pattern instructions tended to yield the same or similar results
m most cases, leading one to conclude that, in general, the Maryland instruction has no
significant effect on jury functioning or verdicts. This conclusion is supported-by the judi-
cial survey m Maryland as well. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
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Horowitz's second study focused on the effects of nullification
information from judge's instructions and lawyer's arguments on
juries' verdicts and decision making.21 The study divided one-
hundred-forty-four six-person juries into groups of twenty-four.219
Thus, there were six juries each who heard the same one of the
twenty-four possible scenarios. The variables in this research were,
first, whether the instruction was received from the judge or by
means of lawyer's arguments; second, whether the argument or
instruction made reference to the possibility of jury nullification;
third, the three different types of criminal cases presented; and,
finally, the presence or absence of challenges to nullification infor-
mation.22
The three criminal case variables involved in this study were a
drunk driving case, a euthanasia case, and an illegal possession of
a weapon case.22 The judicial instructions variable was either the
standard pattern instructions, based on Ohio Pattern Jury Instruc-
tions, or the radical nullification instructions, based on Van Dyke's
1970 proposal.222  The lawyer's arguments variable reflected
whether the defense attorney did or did not make reference to a
nullification defense.' In the non-nullification defense, attorneys
made no reference to a nullification argument while those lawyers
employing a nullification defense made references to nullification
power in both opening and closing statements.224 The nullification
argument essentially paraphrased the first two parts of the judge's
218. Horowitz, supra note 194, at 439.
219. Id. at 439, 445.
220. Id. at 442.
221. Id. at 443. The euthanasia and drunk driving cases were the same as were used m
the previously discussed study. See supra note 198. The illegal possession of a weapon
case was adapted from a PBS broadcast in 1986 of an actual jury deliberation in a trial
involving the illegal possession of a firearm. In this case, the defendant is a convicted
felon who has for the nine years since his release from prison maintained an impeccable
record. The defendant purchases a revolver after enrolling in a mail order correspondence
course to become a private detective he saw advertised in a magazine. The defendant,
while in the local courthouse observing how real detectives act, told a police officer about
the badge and gun he had purchased. The officer told the defendant to go home and
bring the gun back to the courthouse. Upon doing so, he was arrested. Evidence was
produced at trial indicating that the defendant functioned at about the level of an elemen-
tary school child. Horowitz, supra note 200, at 143-44.
222. Id. at 144. See supra note 181 and 205 for the form of the radical nullification in-
struction.




nullification instruction. 2 Thus, it informed jurors that they had
the final authority to decide whether or not to apply a given law to
the defendant, and that they represented the community and, there-
fore, it would be appropriate for them to bring into their delibera-
tions the feelings of the community and their own feelings based
on their individual conscience. 6
The final variable was the challenge. In each of the cases "the
prosecutor[] either did or did not remind the jurors, in both open-
mg and closing statements, of their obligations to follow the law
regardless of their personal sentiments, despite any insinuations
they may hear to the contrary "rn The prosecutor then challenged
the nullification argument whenever it was made by the defense.
Because "the design did not permit the judge to rule directly on
the objection," the judge merely told the jurors that they may
consider the prosecutor's objection in their deliberations.228
The results of this study indicate that the nullification informa-
tion definitely does affect juries' confidence in their verdicts.22 9
Regardless of whether the nullification information is issued by the
judge's instructions or by the lawyer's arguments, it clearly affects
the jurors' attitudes regarding the verdicts rendered in the case.
When the lawyer makes the nullification argument, however, in
two of the three cases it had a more significant effect on the
jurors' level of confidence in the verdicts than did the judge's
instruction.'
The first case in which the lawyer versus judge distinction had
some impact was the drunk driving case. In this case the lawyer's
nullification argument actually resulted in a more confident guilty
verdict than in any of the other scenarios?2i Beyond the lawyer
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 444-45.
228. Id. at 445.
229. Id. at 450.
230. Id. at 446.
231. The following chart reflects the difference m the verdict scores in the drunk dnv-
ing case depending on whether the lawyer or the judge informed the jury of the possibili-
ty of nullification. (The verdict scores operate the same in this study as in the previously
discussed study. See supra note 209.)
NulIiftcation by Judge Standard Instruction
Lawyer Nullification None Lawyer Nullification None
4.83 4.67 5.17 4.50
(No challenges were made by the prosecution in these cases.)
Horowitz, supra note 200, at 446
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versus judge distinction, this result also confirms the finding in the
previously discussed study that a radical nullification instruction
has the opposite of the desired effect and results in higher convic-
tion rates in certain types of cases.z 2
The second case in which the lawyer versus judge distinction
had an impact was m the illegal possession case. In this scenario,
the strongest not guilty verdict resulted when both the judge in Ins
instructions and the defense attorney in his arguments informed the
jury of the possibility of nullification. The next strongest not guilty
verdict resulted when the lawyer alone argued nullification. The
result in that scenario was a considerably lower verdict score than
when the judge alone informed the jury of their right to nullify thelaw 233
Finally, in the euthanasia case, the lawyer versus judge distinc-
tion was irrelevant when either one informed the jury of their right
to nullify alone. When both the judge and the lawyer, however,
informed the jury about nullification, the verdict was again a sig-
nificantly stronger not guilty verdict.2 4
The second finding of this research is that challenges to nullifi-
cation arguments sharply curtailed the tendency of the juries to
nullify 235 The assertion of a challenge had an impact in all three
types of cases. In the euthanasia and illegal possession cases, juries
were generally less confident in their decision to acquit when pros-
ecutors objected to nullification arguments and reminded the jury
of their obligation to apply the law as explained to them by the
Thus, when the lawyer alone makes a nullification argument and there are no chal-
lenges to it, the jurors' confidence m the guilty verdict is much stronger than when the
judge alone gives the nullification instruction, than when both the judge and the lawyer
inform the jury about nullification, and particularly than when no nullification information
at all is given to the jury.
232. Id at 450.
233. Illegal Possession
Nullification by Judge Standard Instruction
Lawyer Nullification None Lawyer Nullification None
1.80 3.67 2.83 4.00
(No challenges were made by the prosecution in any of these cases.)
Id. at 446.
234. Euthanasia
Nullification by Judge Standard Instruction
Lawyer Nullification None Lawyer Nullification None
2.50 3.30 3.30 '3.70
(No challenges were made by the prosecution in any of these cases.)
Id.
235. Id. at 451.
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judge. In the drunk driving case, the juries handed down less harsh
verdicts under the challenge condition.2 6 The objection or chal-
lenge by the prosecutor in drunk.driving cases, then, would tend to
alleviate the problem identified earlier of juries giving harsher
verdicts than deserved when given nullification information in
particular cases.237
The third finding in this study confirms a finding in Horowitz's
earlier research. The study indicates that the juries which received
nullification information in both the euthanasia and illegal posses-
sion cases spent less time deliberating on the evidence and more
time discussing the jurors' own concepts of what was just rather
than merely lawful under the circumstances. 23 The juries in these
cases apparently "concluded that the evidence favoring convic-
tion was not the relevant or crucial factor" in reaching a ver-
dict.239
In general, this study indicates that "when juries are given
unfettered nullification arguments or instructions, they are more
likely to act upon their sentiments or parochial biases."2' The
source of the nullification information, whether issued by the judge
or the lawyer, appears to not only affect the verdict rendered, but,
in two of the three cases, also affected the juries' confidence in
that verdict.241 A challenge to nullification by the prosecutor was
shown to be sufficient to curtail the juries' desire to be liberated
from the evidence and reduced the juries' confidence in their ver-
236. Nullification by Judge Standard Instruction
Lawyer Null. None Lawyer Null. None
Drunk Driving
Challenge 4.17 4.17 4.67 4.0
None 4.83 4.67 5.17 4.50
Euthanasia
Challenge 3.83 3.83 4.00 4.33
None 2.50 3.30 3.30 3.70
Illegal Possession
Challenge 3.00 3.17 3.17 4.17
None 1.80 3.67 2.83 4.00
Id.
237. The cases which Horowitz judges to be prone to such a phenomenon are those m
which the jury perceived the defendants as dangerous. Id.
238. Id. at 452.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See supra notes 227-30 and accompanying text.
11431993]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
dicts.242 Finally, this study confirmed several earlier findings:
first, that nullification arguments have a reverse effect in cases
where the defendant is perceived as dangerous," and, second,
that juries who receive nullification information spend less time
deliberating about the evidence and more time discussing such is-
sues as defendant characteristics, related personal experiences and
concepts of justice versus lawfulness.244
D. Proposal
On the basis of the various benefits and problems with the
legislative proposals discussed previously, if a jury nullification
statute is to have any realistic chance of being enacted and of
having the desired effect on jury functioning it should be worded
in the following manner:245
IN ALL CRIMINAL TRIALS AND CIVIL TRIALS TO
WHICH THE STATE OR ANY OF ITS AGENCIES IS A
PARTY, THE DEFENSE MAY, AT ITS DISCRETION,
INFORM THE JURORS THAT THEY HAVE THE FI-
NAL AUTHORITY TO DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT
TO APPLY A GIVEN LAW TO THE ACTS OF THE
DEFENDANT ON TRIAL BEFORE THEM; THAT THE
JURORS ARE THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COM-
MUNITY AND AS SUCH IT IS APPROPRIATE FOR
THEM TO BRING INTO THEIR DELIBERATIONS THE
FEELINGS OF THE COMMUNITY AND THEIR OWN
FEELINGS BASED ON CONSCIENCE; AND, THAT
NOTHING WILL PREVENT THE JURORS FROM AC-
QUITTING THE DEFENDANT IF THEY FEEL THAT
APPLYING THE LAW IN THE PARTICULAR CIRCUM-
STANCES BEFORE THEM WOULD PRODUCE AN
INEQUITABLE OR UNJUST RESULT. THE SPIRIT
WHICH SHOULD GUIDE THE DEFENSE ATTORNEY'S
EXERCISE OF HIS/HER DISCRETION TO INFORM
THE JURORS OF THEIR RIGHT TO NULLIFY THE
242. See supra notes 235-37 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 232-34.
244. See supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text.
245. The author wishes to reiterate that her support for the concept of jury nullification
is limited to situations m which it may be argued that applying the law would produce
an unjust result. The following proposal is worded in a manner that is believed to be
consistent with tis view of jury nullification.
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LAW AS APPLIED IN THE CASE BEFORE THEM IS
ANALOGOUS TO HIS/HER ETHICAL RESPONSIBILI-
TIES AS AN OFFICER OF THE COURT AND MEMBER
OF THE BAR, UNDER MODEL CODE 7-102(A)(1) AND
(2), AND MODEL RULE 3.1, NOT TO ADVANCE A
CLAIM THAT IS UNWARRANTED UNDER EXISTING
LAW
There are four unique features to this legislative proposal. First,
it would be limited in the scope of its application to criminal trials
and civil trials to which the state or one of its agencies is a party
Tlus is important because it serves to best promote the policies
behind jury nullification. The two key purposes of jury nullification
are to promote justice and to protect individuals from oppressive or
overly aggressive government.2' If jury nullification is applied in
a civil case, it will serve merely as an escape route for people who
have willingly entered into agreements or who, by their negligence,
have harmed another person. Jury nullification would serve as a
mechanism by which such people can avoid the legal consequences
of their actions. This cannot be said to promote justice and, since
the government is not directly involved, such a result could not be
justified as a protective measure.247 In criminal trials and civil tri-
als to which the government is a party, on the other hand, the
policies of justice and protection may be promoted by jury nullifi-
cation. In such -cases, the government is the opponent of the indi-
vidual. The second policy of protection, then, is automatically
served. Justice can also be promoted in such cases by jurors refus-
ing to enforce the law as established by the government where the
result is likely to be inequitable. Thus, the purposes and policies
behind jury nullification are served when it is applied in criminal
trials and civil trials to which the state is a party, but not in other
civil trials. For this reason, the scope of applicability of the nullifi-
cation instruction should be restricted.
The second unique feature of this proposed legislation is that it
places the power to inform the jurors of their right to nullify the
law in the hands of the defense attorney This route, as opposed to
246. Van Dyke, supra note 45, at 225-27. See supra text accompanying notes 87-89 for
a discussion of the view that reaching a just result, even if not strictly adhering to the
letter of the law, is one policy behind jury nullification.
247. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text for sunilar arguments raised in the
Texas legislative hearings against a nullification instruction applicable in all cases, civil
and criminal.
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the usual mechanism of requiring the judge to inform the jurors of
their right to nullify in the instructions, is preferable for several
reasons. First, many of the objections to the legislative proposals
introduced in 1991 focused on the fact that judges felt statutes
requiring them to inform jurors of their right to disregard the law
placed them in a compromising position. Instead of upholding the
law as they were sworn to do, the judges would now have to tell
jurors they could choose to ignore this law Many judges expressed
discomfort with the apparent conflict in their duties and objected to
the proposed legislation as a result.' The second reason for
placing the responsibility for informing jurors of their right to
nullify the law on defense attorneys instead of judges was in order
to allow the advancement of the argument to be discretionary with-
out significantly increasing the problem of appeals. If a judge was
given the discretion to inform jurors of the right to nullify in ap-
propriate cases, every time the instruction was not issued the deci-
sion would be appealed. In contrast, if the defense attorney is
given the discretion to advance the nullification argument in appro-
priate cases, there are objective standards provided in the legisla-
tion by which to measure his discretion and, therefore, to evaluate
his conduct in case of appeal.
The final reason for giving the defense attorney this right to
advance nullification as opposed to the judge is because empirical
studies have demonstrated that a nullification argument by the
lawyer is equally as and, in some cases, more effective than a
nullification instruction by the judge.249 Since there is no signifi-
cant diminution in the effect of the nullification argument when
made by the attorney, placing the responsibility for advancing the
nullification claim with the defense attorney would strike the prop-
er balance. It is equally as effective while not causing judges to
feel they are compromising their duties or causing a possible ex-
plosion in appeals.
The third unique feature of this proposal is that it makes the
lawyer's responsibility to inform jurors of their right to nullify the
law discretionary The right to advance a nullification claim should
be discretionary in criminal trials and civil trials to which the
government is a party because of the results of empirical studies
which show that the jury is prone to misuse this power in particu-
248. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 229-34 and accompanying text.
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lar types of cases.' In cases where the jury perceives the defen-
dant as dangerous, they show a propensity to convict at a higher
rate when in receipt of a nullification instruction or argument than
when they haven't been informed of their right to nullify 251 It is
not appropriate or even advantageous to raise the nullification
argument in all criminal trials or civil trials to which the govern-
ment is a party In order to safeguard against the tendency of the
jury to misuse the power to nullify in some cases, the decision to
advance the nullification argument should be placed in the defense
attorney's discretion. To guide the attorney in the exercise of his
discretion, the proposed legislation provides a standard which the
attorney should keep in mind before raising a nullification argu-
ment. This standard is analogous to the lawyer's professional re-
sponsibility requirements as set out in Model Code 7-102(A)(1) and
(2) and Model Rule 3.1.252 The general idea of these rules is that
a lawyer may not advance a claim or defense which is unwarranted
by the facts or the law unless he can make a good faith argument
for the extension, modification or reversal of the existing law
Essentially, this means that a lawyer may not raise unwarranted
claims or arguments before the court.15 3 Thus, applying the stan-
250. See supra notes 209-10, 243 and accompanying text.
251. Id.
252. The MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIITY DR 7-102 (1980): Represent-
ng a Client Within the Bounds of the Law states:
(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:
(1) File a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, or take
other action on behalf of his client when he knows or when it is obvious that
such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another.
(2) Knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted
under existing law, except that he may advance such claim or defense if it can
be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal
of existing law.
The MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1983): Meritorious Claims and
Contentions states:
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an
issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which
includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of
existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the re-
spondent in a proceeding that could result in incarceration, may nevertheless so
defend the proceeding as to reqire that every element of the case be estab-
lished.
253. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 cmt. (1983) (stating that
an action is frivolous "if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith argument on
the merits of the action taken or to support the action taken by a good faith argument
for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law").
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dard set forth in the rules of professional responsibility and made
applicable by the statute to the jury's power to nullify, a lawyer
should not advance a claim of nullification when it is unwarranted
by the facts and law of the particular case. The standards on pro-
fessional responsibility, then, provide one yardstick by which a
lawyer can measure whether to exercise his discretion to advance a
claim for jury nullification.
There is, however, another, perhaps more practical, guide for
the lawyer's exercise of discretion. This guide is common sense.
Since several studies have shown that when nullification is ad-
vanced in an inappropriate case (where the defendant is perceived
as dangerous by the jury), juries are prone to judge the defendant
more harshly, a skillful attorney will not attempt to raise the nulli-
fication argument except when it is truly warranted by the
facts.254 The fact that studies show that jurors in such cases are
more likely to convict and to judge the defendant more harshly
overall when in receipt of the nullification information should act
as a very powerful deterrent for lawyers who would advance the
claim m every case. In addition, it would probably deter lawyers
from arguing nullification even in somewhat questionable cases,
where the situation is not completely right for nullification. The
end result should be that skillful lawyers will only argue nullifica-
tion to the jury in cases where nullification is truly warranted by
the facts of the case.
The final unique feature of this proposal is that it uses the
more specific jury nullification instruction as opposed to the rather
vague language employed by Maryland and Indiana in their present
instructions. The empirical studies presented previously reveal that
jurors given the more specific nullification instruction acquitted at a
significantly higher rate in appropriate cases than jurors who re-
ceived the Maryland instructions. In fact, jurors given the vague
nullification instruction of Maryland differed only very slightly in
their acquittal rate from jurors who were not given any nullifica-
tion information at all.' 5 In addition, the survey conducted of
Maryland judges confirms that, at least in the minds of the judges,
the vague nullification instruction has no real effect on ver-
dicts. 6 If the point of the nullification argument is not to simply
254. See supra notes 209-10, 243 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 209.
256. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text (discussing the perceived impact of
the nullification instruction in Maryland on jury verdicts).
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acknowledge the jurors' supposedly historical right to judge the law
as well as the facts, but to actually encourage jurors to promote
justice and protect individuals from government oppression by their
verdicts, then the more specific jury nullification information is
necessary to achieve this result.
Although these features appear to rectify most of the major
concerns regarding the legislative proposals discussed earlier, ele-
ments present in some of the other proposals which proved prob-
lematic have also been eliminated. 7 For example, jury selection
procedures and hierarchy of statutes provisions have not been in-
cluded. Many objections were made to these provisions and they
are not necessary to the proper functioning of the instruction. This
proposal is also a relatively simple expression of the law rather
than a detailed attempt to cover all possible issues which may arise
under it. This characteristic has proved beneficial in both Maryland
and Indiana by providing the courts with the flexibility to establish
the appropriate balance between fulfillment of the jury's role and
protection of the defendant's rights.28
Some of the other issues raised in opposition to the proposed
legislation are more accurately described as objections to the con-
cept of jury nullification. Whether the right to nullify the law
existed at common law, whether jury nullification impedes the
democratic process, and whether it would cause serious consistency
problems are all issues which cannot be resolved in a statute.
IV CONCLUSION
Whether or not one accepts the concept of jury nullification as
supported by history and, therefore, an integral part of the Amen-
can democratic system of government, or even simply as a desir-
able mechanism by which community sentiment can be injected
into the judicial process, in reality jurors will nullify the law when
they are unable, in good conscience, to condemn a person's
acts. 9 Although this tendency has probably existed for a long
time, since the politically turbulent 1960s and 1970s more and
more people have advocated legitimizing this tendency by inform-
ing jurors directly that they not only have the power to nullify the
257. See supra notes 126-62 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
259. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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law, but the rght to do so as well.2" This movement peaked in
recent years with the introduction of jury nullification legislation m
several states.261 These proposals, however, have all been defi-
cient in one manner or another.262
By comparing the proposed legislation and the documented
objections to these proposals with the experiences of Maryland and
Indiana, which currently have jury nullification provisions, it be-
came obvious that one of the greatest drawbacks of the proposed
legislation was the pervasive detail included in the proposals.263
The empirical studies on the function of jury nullification instruc-
tions then revealed that, in order to liberate juries sufficiently to
promote justice through their verdicts, a very explicit nullification
instruction was needed.2' The proposed legislation accounts for
these factors and provides for a jury nullification scheme which
will encourage jurors to consider notions of justice in reaching a
verdict by informing them of their right to nullify the law in ex-
plicit language, while avoiding the pervasive details which have
proven so troublesome in recent proposals. 265
The purpose of this proposal is to provide an alternative model
for future jury nullification statutes. The unique features of this
proposal are an attempt to resolve many of the common objections
to and actual problems with current nullification proposals while,
simultaneously, promoting the true purposes of jury nullification.
Although this proposal cannot resolve the underlying philosophical
problems many have with the concept of jury nullification, this
proposal is a model which, if the philosophical doubts against jury
nullification are ever resolved, will work better in practice and
more efficiently achieve the desired results than any of the statutes
which have been proposed thus far.
M. KRiSTiNE CREAGAN
260. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 93-125 (presenting the legislation proposed m these states).
262. See supra notes 126-62.
263. See supra notes 186-97.
264. See supra notes 206-17.
265. See supra notes 245-58.
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